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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Effortless travel along a smoothly flowing highway is part of the American 
automotive dream—yet it all too often is only a dream, as anyone facing daily 
commuter traffic can confirm.  According to the 2011 Urban Mobility Report by 
Texas A&M University, traffic congestion in U.S. cities caused 4.8 billion wasted 
hours and burned 1.9 billion gallons of fuel, resulting in a “congestion cost” of $101 
billion,1 to say nothing of the tailpipe emissions of vehicles stuck in traffic.  Since 
                                                            
 1 DAVID SCHRANK ET AL., TEX. TRANSP. INST., 2011 URBAN MOBILITY REPORT 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter URBAN MOBILITY REPORT], available at http://www.tti.tamu.edu/documents/ 
mobility _report_ 2011_wappx.pdf. 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5
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1982, travel delay and the cost of congestion have multiplied by a factor of five.2  
During the same period, traffic on the nation’s roadways has steadily increased.  The 
trend clearly appears in Federal Highway Administration statistics showing that from 
1980 to 2007 the yearly number of vehicle-miles traveled on U.S. roads doubled, 
reaching a remarkable three trillion miles.3 
Drivers and vehicles competing for space within the limited confines of the 
nation’s roadways create a classic “tragedy of the commons” by using more and 
more of a freely available public resource—highway capacity—and degrading it 
through their cumulative overuse.4  Policymakers continue to seek viable alternatives 
to single-occupant vehicle travel, yet people balk at options that limit their freedom 
to drive where and when they choose.5  At least for the foreseeable future, 
transportation officials will need to cope with heavy and increasing use of the 
roadway system. 
The use of the roadways takes two main forms.  The first form of use, and the 
most apparent one, is for mobility.  An interstate highway, built to handle large 
volumes of fast-moving traffic, is the best example of a road intended for mobility.  
Vehicles enter and exit at interchanges only, and between those points they flow 
“freely down an unencumbered corridor ‘pipe’” without having to slow or stop for 
other streams of traffic entering or crossing the highway.6  Nearly all travel, though, 
begins and ends off the roadway system, in a place such as a parking lot or 
residential driveway.  This fact points to a second use of the road: it provides access 
                                                            
 2 Id. 
 3 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ANNUAL VEHICLE-MILES OF TRAVEL, 
1980-2009, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2009/pdf/ 
vm2.pdf.  Travel declined between 2007 and 2009, likely due to the economic recession, but it 
is once again increasing.  A comparison of data between November 2010 and November 2009 
shows a 1.1% rise in vehicle-miles traveled.   FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
NOVEMBER 2010 TRAFFIC VOLUME TRENDS, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/tvtw/ 
10novtvt/ index.cfm. 
 4 Christian Iaione, The Tragedy of Urban Roads: Saving Cities from Choking, Calling on 
Citizens to Combat Climate Change, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 889, 890-91 (2010). In his classic 
article, biologist Garrett Hardin illustrated how, even when a common pasture is already 
overgrazed, it is individually rational for each herder to add another animal (and another, and 
another) to his herd since he receives the entire proceeds from selling it but the cost of the 
overgrazing is shared by everyone.  But as Hardin noted, “this is the conclusion reached by 
each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons.  Therein is the tragedy.  Each man is 
locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is 
limited.”  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).  
Many publicly-held resources are vulnerable to this problem.  Hardin’s article gives as 
examples cattle owners who pressure federal officials to allow more cattle to graze on leased 
public land “to the point where overgrazing produces erosion and weed-dominance” and 
tourists who visit national parks that are “open to all, without limit” even though “[t]he values 
that visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded” by the overwhelming number of sightseers.  
Id. at 1245. 
 5 Shi-Ling Hsu, What is a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign 
Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. REV. 75, 126 (2005). 
 6 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., WHAT IS ACCESS MANAGEMENT?, 
available at http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/access_mgmt/what_is_accsmgmt.htm. 
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to properties that abut it.  A residential subdivision street, lined with parked cars and 
driveways, is a prime example of a road mainly intended to provide access to 
property.7 
Unfortunately, the mobility and access functions are often at odds with one 
another, especially when traffic is heavy.  When one vehicle turns from a main 
arterial road into a side street or driveway, other vehicles on the main road must slow 
down, change lanes, or stop.8  This disruption of smooth traffic flow might result in 
an accident, particularly if another driver is not paying attention or makes a sudden 
lane change to avoid the turning auto.9  More typically, the disruption caused by the 
turning auto will persist as vehicle after vehicle brakes in response to the slowdown 
in front of it.  Similarly, when a vehicle attempts to enter a busy main road from a 
driveway or side street, heavy traffic can make the movement difficult and 
dangerous.10   
In an effort to balance the competing functions of mobility and access, many 
state and local governments are adopting access management programs.11  Access 
management is defined as “the systematic control of the location, spacing, design, 
and operation of driveways, median openings, interchanges, and street connections 
to a roadway.”12  The goal of an access management program “is to ensure roadway 
safety and efficient operations while providing reasonable access to the adjacent land 
use.”13  When implemented on a given roadway, access management may mean 
fewer (and more widely separated) driveways and street intersections; the 
construction of dedicated right-turn lanes to driveways that serve multiple properties; 
and the use of median barriers with openings located near traffic signals, so that left-
turn and U-turn movements can only be made when oncoming traffic is stopped.  In 
the 101 urban areas studied in the 2011 Urban Mobility report, access management 
techniques such as these reduced delay by 77 million hours.14 
                                                            
 7 Id.   
 8 Id.; see also NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, REPORT 121, PROTECTION OF 
HIGHWAY UTILITY 46-47 (1971). 
 9 A Purdue University study, published several years before the advent of the first 
statewide access management program, found driveway-related crashes to be a significant 
percentage (13.95%) of all motor vehicle accidents.  WILLIAM W. MCGUIRK, EVALUATION OF 
FACTORS INFLUENCING DRIVEWAY SAFETY, INTERIM REPORT (1973), available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5703/1288284313850. 
 10 WHAT IS ACCESS MANAGEMENT?, supra note 6; NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 47. 
 11 According to data from the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, 
twenty states have extensive access management programs and all but ten have some form of 
access management effort.  ACCESS MGMT. COMM., TRANSP. RESEARCH BD., STATE WEB 
PAGES (2009), available at http://www.accessmanagement.info/AM2005/StateWebpages.htm.  
Each of the 101 urban areas given detailed study in the 2011 Urban Mobility Report reported 
some level of access management, covering about one-third of the street miles in the cities.  
URBAN MOBILITY REPORT, supra note 1, at B-31.  
 12  NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM; REPORT 548, A GUIDEBOOK FOR 
INCLUDING ACCESS MANAGEMENT IN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING 3 (2005). 
 13 Id. 
 14 URBAN MOBILITY REPORT, supra note 1, at B-31, B-33. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5
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When more governmental control is exerted over where and how a road may be 
accessed, however, the interests of the public may collide with those of property 
owners.  A few examples will illustrate the kinds of problems that can arise: 
Some older commercial properties have their entire road frontage paved, so 
customer vehicles turn directly from the road into parking spaces.  Often, the 
buildings are located so close to the road that the parking stalls overlap the public 
right-of-way.  Replacing this wide-open access with defined driveways lessens the 
number of places where vehicles entering or exiting the parking lot can cross the 
movement of vehicles on the road, limiting these “conflict points” to the discrete 
areas where the driveways meet the road.  Fewer conflict points mean fewer 
accidents and less “friction” between through traffic and vehicles entering and 
exiting the road.  But if the commercial property was laid out so that the public road 
functioned like a parking lot aisle, restricting access to one or two defined driveways 
might mean a loss of parking spaces that the business depends upon.15 
Gas stations provide another example of the difficulties that may arise when 
modern access controls are imposed on older developed properties.  Historically, 
many gas stations were located at street corners and laid out with two driveways on 
each side of the property so vehicles could enter and exit the rows of gas pumps 
without having to turn around on-site.  Traffic engineers studying accident patterns 
have determined, however, that driveways near intersections cause accidents because 
they require drivers to make too many decisions in too little space (and time).16  To 
mitigate this problem, the street authority may reduce the number of driveways 
allowed and require them to be as far as possible from the intersection.17  This 
change in access may lead to litigation if the gas station operator perceives that it 
will turn customers away.18 
Disputes can also happen when undeveloped properties are affected by access 
management efforts.  One such case arose after the City of Waterloo, Illinois enacted 
legislation that allowed access to a new bypass at widely-spaced street intersections 
only, reasoning that the two-lane rural road might someday be improved to a five-
lane urban highway.19  The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) had 
already granted driveway permits to the owners of a farm parcel abutting the bypass, 
but when they later sought approval of a commercial subdivision using two of the 
IDOT-permitted driveways, the city denied it as inconsistent with the ordinance and 
                                                            
 15 Galvis v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 584, 586 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
 16 FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., INTERSECTION SAFETY ISSUE BRIEFS: 
ACCESS MANAGEMENT, available at http://www.safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersection/resources/ 
fhwasa10005/doc/brief_13.cfm. 
 17 See, e.g., In re I/M/O Route 206 at Lot 13B New Amwell, 731 A.2d 56, 58-59 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (closing drive that was too close to intersection).  New Jersey 
requires 100 feet of clearance between a driveway and a signalized intersection.  N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 16:47-3.8(k)(3) (2011).  If a property’s access points are placed at the corners farthest 
from the intersection, it “interferes least with intersectional operations.” NAT’L COOP. 
HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 48.  “As a general rule, the farther from an 
intersection a driveway can be located, the less it will affect arterial traffic.”  Id. at 53. 
 18 In re I/M/O Route 206, 731 A.2d at 63. 
 19 State Bank of Waterloo v. City of Waterloo, 792 N.E.2d 329, 330-31 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2003). 
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the projected future expansion of the highway.20  The farm owners argued that 
Waterloo could not use driveways that IDOT had already accepted as a reason to 
reject the plat, but the court held that a municipality could enforce access regulations 
more stringent than the state’s.21 
Another recent case involved an Ohio city’s effort to channel traffic from a 
planned technology park onto an interior loop road being built by the city on land it 
was appropriating for that purpose.22  At trial in the appropriation case, the property 
owners claimed damages of $4 to $6 million for loss of access to the abutting state 
highway, contending that their farm property had no actual access to the loop road 
and that the remaining access to the state highway was insufficient for future 
development.23  The jury found no damages and the appeals court affirmed, holding 
that the jury could consider whether access to the loop road would be reasonably 
foreseeable when the farm actually develops.24 
When a government agency acts to regulate the consumption of highway 
capacity by managing access to it—and, more pointedly, when an owner of abutting 
property wants to have access to a public road in a way that the government agency 
is not willing to allow, some important legal questions arise.  What right of access 
does the owner of abutting property have?  How far can the government agency 
regulate access to the road?  Many courts hold that a taking occurs if a governmental 
act amounts to a substantial or material interference with access, but how is that 
measured?  And what is “access” anyway? 
This Article will begin by examining how the concept of a right of access to an 
abutting roadway developed and how courts treated early efforts to regulate roadway 
access for public welfare and safety.  Next, we will see how public authorities began 
to comprehend the differences between mobility and land access and to perceive the 
conflict between traffic volume, traffic speed, and frequent driveways and 
intersections.  This new knowledge led to the adoption of statewide permit-based 
programs to manage access to roadways using criteria calibrated to match each 
road’s function in the continuum between access and mobility.  We will identify 
some of the important common features of those programs.   
Turning to the modern law of access, this Article will highlight the significant 
distinctions between access to land, accessibility within the network of roadways, 
and access to traffic volume and suggest how the reasonableness of access can be 
evaluated.  We will then analyze what implications these distinctions have for access 
management programs.  Finally, we will consider the “access” concept as an 
assertion of private rights in the commons of the roadway and what that means for 
the balancing of public and private interests.  The Article will conclude by 
recommending that the adequacy of access should be evaluated in physical terms 
only, because economic constructs such as the “convenience” of access amount to an 
unwarranted claim to perpetuate a preferred location within the road network. 
                                                            
 20 Id. at 330. 
 21 Id. at 332-34.  Given the posture of the case, the court did not have to decide whether 
the city’s actions amounted to a taking of access rights.  Id. at 337. 
 22 City of Dublin v. Pewamo Ltd., 954 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
 23 Id. at 1227. 
 24 Id. at 1228, 1231-32. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5
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II.  THE UNCLEAR ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE “RIGHT OF ACCESS” 
The United States is woven together by a network of roads—over four million 
miles of them, occupying about one percent of the country’s land mass.25  Many of 
these roads are owned by the public in fee simple.  In other instances, usually in rural 
areas, the right-of-way is a perpetual easement.  Seemingly a lesser interest, a 
highway easement nonetheless gives the public full control of the land between the 
right-of-way lines, even as against the fee owner.26  This control is so broad that 
there is little practical difference between a highway easement and public ownership 
of the land on which the highway is built.27   
Whenever we enter this roadway network—whenever we leave a driveway and 
pull out into the street—an imperceptible and seldom-considered threshold is 
crossed.  The roads we use (and need to use) every day to reach our homes and 
businesses belong to someone else.   
Just what happens upon crossing the threshold between private property and a 
public road is, in the realm of legal rights, a question that has bedeviled courts for 
years.  Some judicial opinions affirming that a property owner has a right of access 
to an abutting public road speak rather cautiously of “a property right in the nature of 
an easement in the street”28 or a “right . . . in the nature of a property right.”29  Other 
                                                            
 25 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DISTANCE TO NEAREST ROAD IN 
THE COTERMINOUS UNITED STATES, available at http://www.fort.usgs.gov/products/ 
publications/21426/21426.pdf.  The percentage in urban areas is much greater: Even forty 
years ago, a report estimated that “[a]bout 28 percent of the developed land of an urban area 
may be devoted to highway rights-of-way.” NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, 
supra note 8, at 35. 
 26 See, e.g., United States v. Certain Land in Cook County, 248 F. Supp. 681, 682-83 (D. 
Minn. 1965) (stating that owner’s fee simple interest was “burdened by a substantially 
exclusive easement for highway purposes, and defendant retains no right to the use and 
enjoyment of this land”); People v. Henderson, 85 Cal. App. 2d 653, 657 (Ct. App. 1948) 
(stating that fee owners had no right to put a shed in the right-of-way, even though it did not 
interfere with travel: “[D]efendants as owners of the fee would have had no greater right than 
those who were strangers to the title.”); Paquet v. Mt. Tabor St. Ry. Co., 18 Ore. 233, 235 
(1889) (“The establishment of a public highway practically divests the owner of the fee to the 
land upon which it is laid out of the entire present beneficial interest.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Van Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 135 S.E.2d 640, 642-43 (N.C. 1964) 
(stating that public control of a highway easement is “so exclusive in extent that the 
subservient estate in the land . . . amounts to little more than the right of reverter in the event 
the easement is abandoned” and “the difference between an easement of this nature and extent 
and a fee simple estate in the land covered by the right of way is negligible”); 5 JULIUS L. 
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 16.02(7) (rev. 3d ed., 1997) (“Where land already 
subject to a highway easement is taken for highway purposes it has been held that only 
nominal damages may be recovered.”). 
 28 Bacich v. Bd. of Control, 144 P.2d 818, 823 (Cal. 1943); see also Simkins v. Davenport, 
232 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1975) (stating that the owner of land abutting a highway has “a 
property right in the nature of an easement” of access to the highway); State ex rel. State 
Highway Dep't v. 14.69 Acres of Land, 226 A.2d 828, 831 (Del. 1967) (stating that the right 
of access is “said to be ‘in the nature of an easement’”). 
 29 County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Minn. 1997). 
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courts step out further, calling this rather amorphous right “fundamental”30 or 
“basic.”31  Still, its ancestry is “obscure.”32  As the New Mexico Supreme Court put 
it, “The ‘right of access’ is apparently judge-made, the exact origin of which is 
difficult to determine.”33 
Yet origins are important.  Early decisions on a subject are often the most 
revealing, because when there is no precedent to lean on, courts must more fully 
explain their reasoning.  Understanding how, and to what degree, a particular interest 
attained legal recognition is also necessary when considering whether it is 
“sufficiently bound up with . . . reasonable expectations . . . to constitute ‘property’ 
for Fifth Amendment purposes.”34  For those reasons, we begin with a look at the 
law of access at its inception. 
A.  No Compensation for “Right Use of Property Already Belonging  
to the Public”: The 1823 Decision in Callender v. Marsh 
In the early nineteenth century, when the nation’s surface transportation network 
was in its infancy and travel moved no faster than a horse could go, there was little 
need to regulate access between publicly-built roads and adjoining private property.35  
Sometimes, though, public improvements to a road would affect an abutting 
landowner’s access to it.  Early roads often followed the natural contours of the land 
over which they were built.  As population and trade increased, local officials might 
improve a road by building up the grade in a low place or cutting it down on a hill to 
make the road easier and safer to traverse.  Such changes, while beneficial to the 
public using the road, could be detrimental to the properties next to the cut or filled 
areas. 
That was the problem presented in the widely-followed 1823 Massachusetts 
opinion in Callender v. Marsh. 36  The case arose when the surveyor of highways in 
Boston decided to reduce the grade of a road on a steep hill in front of the plaintiff’s 
                                                            
 30 BSW Dev. Grp. v. City of Dayton, 699 N.E.2d 1271, 1275 (Ohio 1998). 
 31 People ex rel. Dep’t of Public Works v. Ayon, 352 P.2d 519, 522 (Cal. 1960). 
 32 D'Arago v. State Rds. Com., 180 A.2d 488, 490 (Md. 1962) (citing Bacich, 144 P.2d at 
823).   
 33 State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Danfelser, 384 P.2d 241, 243 (N.M. 1963). 
 34 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978). 
 35 The private builders of chartered turnpikes had a right to erect toll-gates and charge 
people to pass through them, but even so, an abutting landowner had no duty to pay unless his 
travel took him through a toll-gate. See, e.g., Buncombe Turnpike Co. v. Mills, 32 N.C. 30, 34 
(1849) (finding that a company had no authority to charge for use of turnpike that began and 
ended between toll-gates which, by statutory charter, had to be spaced at least ten miles apart); 
Lexington & Georgetown Turnpike Co. v. Redd, 41 Ky. 30, 31-32 (1841) (holding that a 
company had no claim against abutter who leased a strip of ground to connect his property 
with the turnpike at a point between town and the first toll-gate, and closed up his access point 
to the turnpike beyond the toll-gate). 
 36 Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. 418, 425 (1823).  John Lewis, the author of an early 
treatise on eminent domain law, described Callender as the “leading case” on street grades, 
attributing to it “an important influence in moulding the law in this country.”  JOHN LEWIS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 94 (1900). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5
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house.37  Cutting down the road exposed the house’s foundation and endangered its 
stability, requiring costly efforts to correct.38   
The owner contended that the surveyor’s change to the grade of the road was a 
compensable taking under the state constitution, arguing that a taking occurred not 
only when an individual’s land is occupied for public use, “but likewise where he is 
injured in respect to an incorporeal right.”39  The surveyor replied that, although 
other individuals had suffered similar consequences from grade changes, no one had 
ever brought suit before, “and if such an action can be sustained, it will put a check 
to all improvements in our highways.”40 
The Callender court agreed with the surveyor, deciding that a taking occurs only 
when property is “actually taken” and occupied by the government, and ruling that 
the constitutional provision requiring compensation for takings did not apply “to the 
case of one who suffers an indirect or consequential damage or expense, by means of 
the right use of property already belonging to the public.”41   
As the court reasoned, neighboring homeowners have no right to seek payment 
when a schoolhouse is built on public land, even though the resulting crowd and 
noise may materially reduce the value of their dwellings.42  Moreover, even though 
the road might have been established on an easement, with the abutting owner 
retaining title to the soil, “the public acquired the right, not only to pass over the 
surface in the state it was in when first made a street, but the right also to repair and 
amend the street, and, for this purpose, to dig down and remove the soil sufficiently 
to make the passage safe and convenient.”43   
With regard to compensation, the abutting owner had a right to seek payment 
from the government when the road was established “not only on account of the 
value of the land taken” but also “for the diminution of the value of the adjoining 
lots, calculating upon the future probable reduction or elevation of a street or road.”44  
                                                            
 37 Callender, 18 Mass. at 425. 
 38 Id. at 425. 
 39 Id. at 429.  The incorporeal right at issue in Callender was not access to the street, but a 
right to rely on the earth under the street to provide support to the adjacent building.  Whether 
such a right exists was debatable, then and now.  See Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 645 
(1879) (“[T]his right of lateral support extends only to the soil in its natural condition. It does 
not protect whatever is placed upon the soil increasing the downward and lateral pressure. If it 
did, it would put it in the power of a lot-owner, by erecting heavy buildings on his lot, to 
greatly abridge the right of his neighbor to use his lot. It would make the rights of the prior 
occupant greatly superior to those of the latter.”); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Tishner, 699 
N.E.2d 731, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[A] landowner has an absolute right to have his land 
in its natural state laterally supported by the lands of adjoining landowners. . . .  There is, 
however, no such absolute right to lateral support of buildings. Liability for damage to 
buildings resulting from the loss of lateral support must be based upon the negligence of the 
adjoining landowner in carrying on the activity which occasioned the loss of lateral support.”). 
 40 Callender, 18 Mass. at 430. 
 41 Id. at 437. 
 42 Id. at 439. 
 43 Id. at 438. 
 44 Id. at 439.   
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The buyers of those lots could decide for themselves whether the city’s growth 
might someday warrant changes to the road and price their purchase offers 
accordingly.45  Similarly, owners of property abutting a road had to think about 
whether the grade might be changed and locate their buildings accordingly.46   
The Callender court realized that its market-based approach might not always 
account for the effects of future grade changes: “although, theoretically, all this may 
be considered as determined when the street is originally laid out, yet practically 
there may be cases where this just provision has been overlooked.”47  This 
realization prompted the court to remark that the legislature might enact a statute 
providing for an adjudication (and compensation) when long-existing streets are 
raised or lowered to the detriment of abutting houses.48  Nonetheless, under the 
common law, the surveyor of highways was plainly not liable for damages, for his 
acts occurred on public property and under color of a statute that authorized him to 
do the work.49  
B.  Sharing the Streets with Publicly-Authorized Users: The 1839 Decision in 
Lexington and Ohio Rail Road Co. v. Applegate 
Another kind of access-related litigation began when local governments decided 
to let railroads operate in public streets.  Railroads provided an important 
transportation service to the public, yet they were privately owned, and their rails 
and road-beds physically occupied part of the public space.  The presence of railroad 
structures and trains changed how the street could be used, potentially to the 
detriment of nearby properties.  But did owners of property abutting a street have 
any legally-protected right in it to assert against the railroad’s municipally-
authorized use?   
Steam railroads were cutting-edge technology in 183850 when the Lexington and 
Ohio Rail Road Company began carrying passengers and freight along Main Street 
in Louisville, Kentucky.51  Shortly after the railroad began operating, however, a 
group of property owners and tenants obtained an injunction against it, convincing 
the equity court that the railroad was a nuisance that unlawfully encroached on their 
private property rights in the street.52 
                                                            
 45 Id. at 438. 
 46 Id. at 438-39. 
 47 Id. at 440. 
 48 Id. at 441.  The Massachusetts legislature later passed a law that did provide 
compensation to owners whose property was damaged by the alteration of a road grade.  See 
Morse v. Stocker, 83 Mass. 150, 154-55 (1861). 
 49 Callender, 18 Mass. at 441. 
 50 The B&O railway, generally regarded as the nation’s first, broke ground in 1828.  
JAMES A. WARD, RAILROADS AND THE CHARACTER OF AMERICA 1820-1887 16 (1986).  By 
1837 there were 1,498 operating miles of rail line in the United States.  Id. at 13. 
 51 Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. 289, 290 (1839).  Lexington appears 
to be the first American case dealing with an abutter’s right of access to the street.  Frank M. 
Covey, Jr., Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 NW. U. L. REV. 587, 
588 n.11 (1961). 
 52 Lexington, 38 Ky. at 291. 
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On review, the Kentucky Court of Appeals agreed that the owners of property 
abutting Main Street did have a property right in the street: “a private right of the 
nature of an incorporeal hereditament, legally attached to their contiguous ground     
. . . without which their property would be comparatively of but little value, and 
would never have been bought by them.”53   
Even if the owners of property along the street suffered some inconvenience or 
loss, however, the court of appeals decided that they had no right to an injunction or 
damages if the railroad’s use of the street was consistent with the purposes for which 
the street was established.54  As the court explained, the abutting owners “purchased 
their property, and must hold it . . . subject to any consequences that may result, 
whether advantageously or disadvantageously, from any public and authorized use of 
the streets, in any mode promotive of, and consistent with the purposes of 
establishing them as common highways in town, and compatible with the reasonable 
enjoyment of them by all others entitled thereto.”55   
The Lexington court went on to say that if, in a future case, there was satisfactory 
proof that a railroad’s use of the street “encroaches on any private right, or obstructs 
the reasonable use and enjoyment of the street, by any person who has an equal right 
to the use of it,” then the court would “be ready to enjoin all such wrongful 
appropriation of the highway.”56  Since the record before it did not show that the 
railway had “unreasonably abridged” any public or private right in or use of Main 
Street,57 however, the court of appeals reversed, ordering that the injunction be 
dissolved.58 
C.  Balancing Private Property Rights and the Public Right   
to Improve the Streets: The Ohio Approach 
Early nineteenth century street improvements intended for horse and carriage, 
such as regrading, were a normal characteristic of municipal growth and progress.59  
As the Callender case illustrated, such public betterments could work to the 
disadvantage of people who bought lots and built improvements with reference to 
the street as it was when they came to it.  Yet virtually all courts, when confronted 
with an abutting property owner’s suit for damages, agreed that no common-law 
claim existed—any remedy would have to be provided by the legislature. 
The main exception to this rule was in Ohio.  Beginning in 1846, the Ohio 
Supreme Court recognized an abutter’s common-law claim for damages against a 
municipal corporation even if the city used proper care when changing the grade of a 
                                                            
 53 Id. at 294.  An “incorporeal hereditament” is an intangible right capable of being 
inherited.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (6th ed. 1990).  
 54 Lexington, 38 Ky. at 301. 
 55 Id. at 301-02. 
 56 Id. at 310. 
 57 Id. at 306. 
 58 Id. at 311. 
 59 Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. 418, 426 (1823). 
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street.60  In its subsequent, more comprehensive opinion in Crawford v. Village of 
Delaware, the Ohio court explicitly stated that it was balancing the private right of 
access against the public right to improve the street.61  Interestingly, though, the 
Crawford court did not attach this right to the land next to the street—as suggested 
by the Kentucky court in the Lexington case—but to the buildings erected on that 
land.62   
Significantly, the Ohio court framed the issue in terms of an established street 
grade and a lot owner who put up buildings in a reasonable relation to that grade, 
which the city later changed for the public convenience “so as to substantially and 
materially injure the buildings.”63 Under those circumstances, the Ohio court 
explained, the lot owner’s “use of the street as an incident to his permanent erections 
[and] the private rights of the owner, inherent in and incident to the erections upon 
the lot, are invaded.”64  The injury to the buildings, in the court’s view, was “as 
positive and substantial an injury to private property, and as direct an invasion of 
private right, incident to the lot, as if the erections upon the lot were taken for public 
use.”65 
The court carefully confined its holding to structures built “in good faith” and 
“with a view to the established grade.”66  The owner of an unimproved lot had no 
claim for damages.67  And if the street grade was not established, then a lot owner 
had to use reasonable care to anticipate what the established grade might be, and 
locate any buildings accordingly.68  But once the public had “defined the interests 
and improvements necessary” for a highway by establishing grades, creating 
roadside drainage swales, installing culverts, and the like, then the owners of 
abutting lots had “the right to assume this exercise of authority as a final decision of 
the wants of the public, and to make their improvements in reference to it.”69 
                                                            
 60 Crawford v. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459, 464-65 (1857) (citing McComb v. 
Town of Akron, 15 Ohio 474 (1846)).  The Ohio court acknowledged that its position was 
unique and in direct conflict with decisional law in the United States and England.  Id. at 465. 
 61 Id. at 469-70. 
 62 Id. at 470.   
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 470-71. 
 66 Id. at 470. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id.  A landowner had no claim for damages if alteration to a road made it less 
convenient for travel but did not directly impair “access to the road from the improvements on 
his land.”  Jackson v. Jackson, 16 Ohio St. 163, 163 (1865). 
 69 Cincinnati & Spring Grove Ave. St. Ry. Co. v. Inc. Village of Cumminsville, 14 Ohio 
St. 523, 547 (1863).  The court continued: “If any mistake is made, it is the mistake of the 
public authorities, and cannot be corrected at the expense of those who have acted and 
expended their money on the faith of its being final.”  Id. 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5
2012] ACCESS MANAGEMENT  
 
597 
D.  Statutory Changes in the Late 1800s  
The Callender, Lexington, and Crawford decisions, all of which preceded the 
Civil War, represent some of the earliest judicial efforts to resolve difficulties that 
arose when new transportation technologies and new public works impinged upon 
older property uses.   
Other efforts to resolve those difficulties were legislative.  As the nineteenth 
century went on, some states enacted statutes requiring payment for damage to the 
value of abutting properties resulting from a grade change after the municipal 
corporation had officially established the grade of a street.70  The process to establish 
a permanent grade could be a formal matter, involving public notice, a hearing, and 
recording of the grade line.71  Once the “permanent” grade was established, the act of 
recording vested in the owners of abutting lands a right to be compensated if a future 
change to the grade caused damage to the value of their properties.72 
Absent some enactment to the contrary, however, the common law doctrine 
precluding compensation for damages consequential to “right use of property already 
belonging to the public” still held sway.  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in an 
1878 decision in Transportation Co. v. Chicago: 
The doctrine, however it may at times appear to be at variance with 
natural justice, rests upon the soundest legal reason.  The State holds its 
highways in trust for the public.  Improvements made by its direction or 
by its authority are its acts, and the ultimate responsibility, of course, 
should rest upon it.  But it is the prerogative of the State to be exempt 
from coercion by suit, except by its own consent. . . . The remedy, 
therefore, for a consequential injury resulting from the State’s action 
through its agents, if there be any, must be that, and that only, which the 
legislature shall give.  It does not exist at common law.73 
Because there was no legislative remedy then in effect in Illinois,74 the Court 
concluded that the Northern Transportation Company had no valid claim against the 
                                                            
 70 See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Nagle, 15 N.E. 1, 2 (Ind. 1888) (“[N]o action will lie 
unless the grade has once been established by the [municipal] corporate authorities.”). 
 71 See Kelly v. Mayor of Baltimore, 3 A. 594, 596-97 (Md. 1886) (describing Baltimore’s 
procedure for establishing or changing the grade of a street). 
 72 See, e.g., Moore v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 611, 613 (1883) (describing statutory 
procedure for recording an established grade). 
 73 Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 641-42 (1878).  Like the Massachusetts court in 
Callender, the Supreme Court reasoned that the city’s power over its streets was the same 
whether it held them in fee or by easement: 
It is immaterial whether the fee of the street was in the State or in the city or in the 
adjoining lot-holders.  If in the latter, the State had an easement to repair and improve 
the street over its entire length and breadth, to adapt it to easy and safe passage. 
Id. at 641. 
 74 The Supreme Court was applying Illinois law as it existed before the 1870 constitutional 
amendment that required compensation when private property was “damaged” for public use.  
Id. at 642.   
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City of Chicago for interruption of street and river access to its property during 
construction of the LaSalle Street tunnel under the Chicago River.   
The many jurists who had considered and rejected similar claims, moreover, 
were not acting blindly, as the Supreme Court emphasized: 
The decisions to which we have referred were made in view of Magna 
Charta and the restriction to be found in the constitution of every State, 
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just 
compensation being made.  But acts done in the proper exercise of 
governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, 
though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to 
be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision. They do 
not entitle the owner of such property to compensation from the State or 
its agents, or give him any right of action. This is supported by an 
immense weight of authority.75 
E.  “No Easement of Access . . . As Against any Improvement of the Street for the 
Purpose of Adapting it to Public Travel”: The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1906 Decision 
in Sauer v. City of New York 
By the early twentieth century, courts had seen many years of litigation over 
abutting owners’ rights in a public highway.  Much of this litigation involved 
railroads in the streets.  As the Lexington case illustrates, since at least the 1830s 
public authorities had been allowing railroads to lay their tracks in existing streets.76  
These decisions were meant to foster a synergistic development of rail transportation 
and urban commercial areas.77  Yet a railroad in the street might interfere with the 
street’s ability to provide access to already-developed properties.78  Accordingly, 
between about 1850 and 1910 many “great court battles” were fought over claims 
that a public roadway had been converted into “a right of way for mass transit 
systems at the expense of its street functions.”79 
                                                            
 75 Id.  Ohio’s differing rule was an anomaly noted by the Court: “The decisions in Ohio, so 
far as we know, are the solitary exceptions.”  Id. at 641.  Contemporary writers took the same 
view of the rule’s wide acceptance.  10 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
1124-28 (David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1899) (noting that, except in 
Ohio, a “change of grade in streets made by a municipality, if made in accordance with 
statute, is not such an injury to adjoining property as to require compensation to be made to 
owners unless there is a statute rendering the municipality liable therefor,” and this rule 
applied even when the grade change interfered with access). 
 76 Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. 289, 290-91 (1839). 
 77 Id. at 307. 
 78 See, e.g., Kan., Neb. & Dakota Ry. Co. v. McAfee, 21 P. 1053 (1889) (holding that five-
foot railroad embankment, built eighteen feet from the property line in front of a boarding 
house, left enough room for street traffic, so the owner had no claim against the railroad; 
owner did have a claim for a switch and “wye” track built seven feet from the fence, as the 
remaining street area was too narrow to provide reasonable access to the property). 
 79 ROSS D. NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 50 (1963).  Netherton observed 
that the cases dealing with non-highway use “are still good law” but “seldom applied in the 
courts for the simple reason that nonhighway uses rarely arise in modern practice.”  Id.  
Instead, “the current demands of vehicular transportation have so taxed the capacity of the 
available space in the streets that there is no longer any place for facilities which do not 
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How the battles came out often depended on how much the railroad interfered 
with normal use of the roadway space.  A local street railway, running on rails 
placed at or near grade and sharing the roadway surface with other vehicles, often 
was viewed as just another street use.80  Its presence in the street might be no more 
obtrusive than a series of horse-drawn vehicles carrying the same number of 
passengers.81  On the other hand, if the railroad ran on an embankment, then the 
public could no longer use the raised part of the roadway—a practical form of 
exclusion that some called “‘a perversion of the street from street uses.’”82  Because 
the interference with access did not result from a “legitimate street improvement,” it 
might be considered a compensable taking of the right or easement of access 
appurtenant to land abutting the street.83  In Callender’s descriptive phrase, the 
railroad embankment was not a “right use of property already belonging to the 
public.” 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1906 decision in Sauer v. City of New York highlights 
the critical distinction courts drew between railroad uses and true street 
improvements.84  Relying on law that had developed in railroad cases, Sauer sought 
damages for loss of access after the city constructed a viaduct in the street in front of 
his built-up property.85  The viaduct did impair access to Sauer’s property, and if it 
had been put there because of a railroad, Sauer likely would have had a good claim.86  
Railroads, however, were not allowed to use the viaduct, which was “devoted to 
ordinary traffic by teams, vehicles and pedestrians.”87  
                                                            
contribute directly to expanding the traffic-carrying capacity or efficiency of the street.”  Id.  
Notably, too, the railroad cases were “distinguishable from the bulk of . . . eminent domain 
cases, in that the offending activities were said to be beyond the purposes for which the streets 
were dedicated, instead of furthering road purposes, as, for example, a change of grade or 
regulation of driveway openings would do.”  WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY 
TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 24 (1977). 
 80 Canastota Knife Co. v. Newington Tramway Co., 36 A. 1107, 1108-09 (Conn. 1897).  
New York was the only state that considered an electric street railway to be a new servitude.  
Id. at 1108. 
 81 Lexington, 38 Ky. at 308-09. 
 82 Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 545 (1907) (internal citation omitted).  In an 
1889 decision the Mississippi Supreme Court held that because a “railroad requires a 
permanent structure in the street, the use of which is private and exclusive,” its exclusion of 
“all ordinary travel” was inconsistent with “the legitimate uses of a public street.”  Theobold 
v. Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Ry. Co., 6 So. 230, 230 (1889).  One judge stressed that 
the railroad at issue in Theobold was built to connect distant points and merely passed through 
the city of Vicksburg, using the street to lay its track.  If the railroad lay within the city, and 
was “constructed and used as an ordinary street railway,” then “possibly a different question 
would arise.”  Id. (note following case, LexisNexis). 
 83 Sauer, 206 U.S. at 544-48. 
 84 Id. at 545. 
 85 Id. at 540.  
 86 Id. at 542-43. 
 87 Id. at 543. 
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Because the viaduct was restricted to ordinary street uses, Sauer was out of luck: 
the state court held that he “had no easement of access . . . as against any 
improvement of the street for the purpose of adapting it to public travel.”88  As the 
Supreme Court put it, the state court “decided that the property alleged to have been 
injured”—namely, an easement of access to the street from the Sauer property—“did 
not exist.”89   
The Supreme Court also observed that the state court’s rejection of a takings 
claim, when the interference with access resulted from a street improvement made 
for ordinary vehicular travel, appeared “to be in full accord with the decisions of all 
other courts in which the same question has arisen.”90 Despite their many 
disagreements in railroad cases, nearly all the state courts did agree on one point: if 
public authorities improved a street for purposes of general public travel, then under 
the common law the owner of abutting land was not entitled to damages for 
impairment of access.91  As the Sauer court concluded: 
“The doctrine of the courts everywhere, both in England and in this 
country (unless Ohio and Kentucky are excepted), is that so long as there 
is no application of the street to purposes other than those of a highway, 
any establishment or change of grade made lawfully, and not negligently 
performed, does not impose an additional servitude upon the street, and 
hence is not within the constitutional inhibition against taking private 
property without compensation, and is not the basis of an action for 
damages, unless there be an express statute to that effect.”92 
According to the Supreme Court in Sauer, then, at the beginning of the twentieth 
century there was no common law property right that an owner of abutting land 
could assert when a public project, undertaken within the existing public right-of-
way to improve the road for ordinary travel, interfered with access between that 
property and the road.  But, as the following part of this Article will describe, the 
common law was not the only game in town. 
F.  State Constitutional Changes and the Law of Access at the Dawn of the 
Automobile Age 
We have seen that, in 1878 and again in 1906, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
that an impairment of access to abutting property, caused by an improvement made 
within a street to serve the purposes of general public travel, was not a taking of a 
property right.  As the Court’s Sauer decision remarked: 
The state courts have uniformly held that the erection over a street of an 
elevated viaduct, intended for general public travel and not devoted to the 
exclusive use of a private transportation corporation, is a legitimate street 
improvement equivalent to a change of grade; and that, as in the case of a 
change of grade, an owner of land abutting on the street is not entitled to 
                                                            
 88 Id. at 542. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 543-44. 
 91 Id. at 544. 
 92 Id. at 545 (quoting Willis v. Winona City, 60 N.W. 814, 815 (Minn. 1894)). 
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damages for the impairment of access to his land and the lessening of the 
circulation of light and air over it.93 
This uniformity of holdings was significant as far as it went, for within the realm 
of the common law, abutting property owners whose access was impaired by a 
legitimate street improvement—by a “right use of property already belonging to the 
public”—had no claim for damages.  In effect, whatever right they had to get 
between their property and the street was subordinate to the public’s right to improve 
the street for general public travel.  Courts recognized that this rule might produce 
harsh results in some cases, particularly when valuable buildings laid out to conform 
to the previous street grade ended up far below (or far above) the traveled way, but 
the common law did not provide a remedy.   
The near-unanimity in common law doctrine, however, masked a broad popular 
movement for change.  In the last decades of the nineteenth century, public works 
projects became increasingly larger, and the adverse effects they sometimes had on 
already-developed properties could not be ignored.  Consequential damages from 
street grading were “especially widespread in Chicago, which was built on a swamp. 
Street raising projects in Chicago in the mid-nineteenth century, covering the entire 
downtown area and many nearby neighborhoods, had buried the first floors of many 
existing buildings.”94  This problem, along with widespread concern over abusive 
practices by railroads, led Illinois to amend its constitution to state that “‘private 
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.’”95 
These same concerns “caught the imagination of constitutional conventions in 
many other states as well.  By 1880, a mere ten years after Illinois pioneered the 
‘taking or damage’ clause, eleven other states had adopted similar constitutional 
provisions.  By 1912, twenty-five of the forty-eight states had a ‘taking or damage’ 
provision . . . .”96   
The constitutional changes effectively divided the states into two broad camps.  
One group required compensation only when private property was “taken” for public 
use.  Although these states may have recognized a property right of access to an 
abutting street, it was a subordinate one: 
But as all streets are established primarily for the public use and the 
general good, the right of the public is paramount to the right of the 
individual.  And so the private rights of access, light and air are held and 
enjoyed subject to the paramount right of the public to use and improve 
the street for the purposes of a highway.  And as these private rights are 
thus subject to the right of the public to use and improve as a highway, it 
follows that, when such uses or improvements are made, no private right 
is interfered with and consequently no private property is taken.97 
                                                            
 93 Id. at 544. 
 94 Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth-
Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 119 (1999). 
 95 Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
 96 Id. at 119-20. 
 97 Barrett v. Union Bridge Co., 243 P. 93, 94 (Or. 1926) (internal citation omitted).  As the 
Barrett court pointedly observed, the Oregon constitution requires just compensation when 
private property is taken for public use, but “[t]he word ‘damaged’ is not used.”  Id. at 93. 
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The other group, which required compensation when property was “damaged” 
for public use, replaced the common law rule with one that more closely resembled 
Ohio’s.  Cases applying this new constitutional provision were “nearly uniform in 
holding [that] . . . where a grade is once established by public authority, and private 
property is improved with reference thereto, a subsequent alteration or change in that 
grade to the damage of abutting property renders the municipality liable.”98   
If the grade of a road had not yet been established, however, the decisions were 
not so uniform.99  Some courts reasoned that the constitutional change entirely 
abrogated the common law rule; accordingly, they required payment of damages 
even for the first grade of a road.100  Others, however, found liability only when an 
established grade had been altered, reasoning that abutting lot owners should expect 
a road’s original, natural surface to be improved when public travel required it.101 
Courts limited the sweep of this new rule in other important ways, as well.  To be 
constitutionally cognizable, the “damage” had to result from some direct physical 
disturbance of a right—regulation alone would not suffice.102  And the right had to 
be one enjoyed “in connection with” the property.103  This meant that a damage 
claim must relate to access between the road and the property: a change to the street 
network causing a loss of convenient accessibility lacked the requisite connection 
because everyone using the affected road experienced it, whether they owned 
property there or not.104  Finally, benefits resulting from the public project might 
partly or even totally offset any injury.105  For example, a street grade change might 
                                                            
 98 Sallden v. City of Little Falls, 113 N.W. 884, 884 (Minn. 1907). 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 885. 
 101 See, e.g., City of Mangum v. Todd, 141 P. 266, 269 (Okla. 1914); Gray v. Salt Lake 
City, 138 P. 1177, 1182-84 (Utah 1914). 
 102 City of Mangum, 141 P. at 267 (citing 4 JOHN FORREST DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 1684-85 (5th ed. 1911)); see also Rigney v. Chicago, 
102 Ill. 64, 80-81 (1881) (“In all cases, to warrant a recovery it must appear there has been 
some direct physical disturbance of a right, either public or private, which the plaintiff enjoys 
in connection with his property, and which gives to it an additional value, and that by reason 
of such disturbance he has sustained a special damage with respect to his property in excess of 
that sustained by the public generally.”). 
 103 Rigney, 102 Ill. at 81. 
 104 Courts drew an important distinction between “general” and “special” damages in 
access cases.  If a transportation project made travel to and from the property less 
convenient—for example, by blocking a street some distance away from the property—courts 
normally found no legally-cognizable damage, even in states that had constitutions requiring 
compensation when property was damaged for public use.  See, e.g., Rude v. City of St. Louis, 
6 S.W. 257 (Mo. 1887).  Under those circumstances, the damages were general: they were 
suffered by everyone using the street, though perhaps in a greater degree by those who lived 
or owned property there.  Id.  If the obstruction made it difficult to get between the property 
and the road, by contrast, the ensuing damage was special—peculiar to that property—and 
therefore a compensable form of damage.  See, e.g., Gilbert v. Greeley, Salt Lake & Pac. Ry. 
Co., 22 P. 814 (Colo. 1889).  
 105 Schroeder v. Joliet, 59 N.E. 550, 551 (Ill. 1901) (“The rule has long been settled that if 
property is actually taken and applied to a public use this provision of the constitution requires 
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make a residential property become suitable for commercial use, and if so, that 
benefit would be set off against damage to the existing use.106   
Accordingly, at the beginning of the automobile age, the “default rule” still held 
that disruption of access to and from property abutting a road, caused by an 
improvement built for purposes of public travel within the existing right-of-way, was 
not a taking of a property right.  Some states had enacted statutes providing for 
compensation under those circumstances; many adopted constitutional amendments 
requiring payment when certain factors (such as alteration of established grade, 
direct physical disturbance, and special damages not offset by benefits) were present.  
But regulation of access, especially where motor vehicles could conflict with 
pedestrians or other traffic, presented a new set of circumstances.107  And so it is to 
those matters that we will turn next. 
III.  THE GROWTH OF AUTOMOBILE USE AND THE BEGINNINGS OF ACCESS 
REGULATION 
In 1904, two years before the Supreme Court’s Sauer decision, there were 55,290 
registered cars and trucks in the United States. 108  By 1910, four years after Sauer, 
the number rose to 468,500.109  A decade later it was almost twenty times greater: 
9,239,161 vehicles were registered in 1920.110  The use of automobiles spread so 
rapidly that, while only one of every sixty families owned an automobile in 1915, by 
1925 one family in eight had a car.111   
                                                            
that it shall be paid for in money, regardless of benefits to other land of the same owner of 
which he is not deprived. Where property is not actually taken by the public for its use but the 
question is whether it has been damaged for public use, the ordinary rule for the determination 
of that question is applied, and if the market value of the property is not decreased there is no 
damage and there can be no recovery.”). 
 106 See, e.g., Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161, 169 (1888) (explaining that even though 
construction of viaduct meant property was no longer suitable for use as a coal yard, “that 
would not be material if it can be rented or sold at as good a price for other purposes”); Moore 
v. City of Atlanta, 70 Ga. 611, 614 (1883) (explaining that no recovery would be had if 
improved accessibility resulting from the street grading project “equaled the inconvenience or 
discomfort [caused to] the home as a mere residence”); Brown v. City of Seattle, 31 P. 313, 
314 (Wash. 1892) (“[D]amages are now recoverable by the owners of land abutting upon 
streets and highways, for any permanent injury inflicted upon such abutting lands, by any 
material change of grade or obstruction to the abutter's access, where the damages thus 
inflicted exceed the benefits derived from the grading or other improvement.”). 
 107 One writer has observed that in modern access cases, the “damaged” provision has 
significance only when access is impaired by a change of grade: “In other areas of access loss, 
the compensation question does not in general turn on the presence vel non of ‘damaged,’ 
though in some opinions the word seems to predispose to a result more liberal to the 
landowner than otherwise might have been.”  William B. Stoebuck, The Property Right of 
Access Versus the Power of Eminent Domain, 47 TEX. L. REV. 733, 758 (1969). 
 108 Spencer Miller, Jr., History of the Modern Highway in the United States, in HIGHWAYS 
IN OUR NATIONAL LIFE 88, 95 (Jean Labatut & Wheaton J. Lane eds., 1950).  Ten years 
earlier, only four experimental vehicles were in use.  Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID 78 (2007). 
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The thoroughfares that these automobiles shared with horse-drawn vehicles were 
not unlike today’s streets.  At the center of the street, municipal authorities would 
leave open “an unobstructed driveway of ample width for the passage of teams,” but 
the edges of the right-of-way could be used for other public purposes, such as 
sidewalks, curbs, gutters, fire hydrants, and plots of grass and trees.112  A city or 
village also might “under reasonable regulations and conditions, permit private 
driveways to be built from the lands of the abutting owners to the driveway of the 
street.”113  And when a private driveway was permitted, the municipality could “bend 
the line of curbing in towards the sidewalk” to “limit the private driveway and 
prevent teams from passing over the grass or running against the trees.”114 
Since a municipal corporation had discretion to permit, under reasonable 
regulations and conditions, the construction of a driveway connecting private 
property to the traveled part of the street, did it also have discretion to deny it?  As 
the following discussion will show, the results of the earliest decisions answering 
that question were mixed. 
A.  Access may be Regulated but not Denied Altogether:                                         
The 1910 Goodfellow Tire Decision  
In perhaps the first driveway permit case, decided in 1910, the Michigan 
Supreme Court considered a boulevard statute that stated: “Carriage or drive ways 
and foot walks connecting with any premises adjoining the boulevard . . . shall be 
allowed only on a permit issued” by the commissioner of parks and boulevards.115  
This statute, according to Detroit’s commissioner, allowed him to deny the 
Goodfellow Tire Company a permit to construct any driveway to Grand 
Boulevard.116  Without a driveway to the boulevard, however, the only way vehicles 
or pedestrians could reach Goodfellow Tire’s property was through an alley.117 
Against the commissioner’s claim that the power to permit access included the 
power to deny it entirely, the Michigan court quoted a legal encyclopedia’s 
statements that an abutter has a right of “‘free and unimpeded ingress and egress to 
and from his property for himself and animals and goods’” and “‘an indefeasible 
right of access to and from their property to the street.’”118  The commissioner, by 
                                                            
 112 Dougherty v. Trs. of Horseheads, 53 N.E. 799, 800 (N.Y. 1899). 
 113 Id.  
 114 Id. 
 115 Goodfellow Tire Co. v. Comm’r of Parks & Boulevards of Detroit, 128 N.W. 410, 412 
(Mich. 1910) (internal citation omitted). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Goodfellow Tire owned the rear half of several lots at the corner of Woodward Avenue 
and Grand Boulevard.  The front half of the lots, facing Woodward Avenue, was owned by 
someone else and occupied by a block of stores, precluding access to Woodward.  Id. at 410.  
If no driveway was allowed to Grand Boulevard, then vehicular access would have been 
possible only by way of the alley behind the lots.  Id. 
 118 Id. at 412 (quoting WILLIAM MACK, 28 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 856-57, 
863 (1908)).  The quoted sections deal with the powers of municipal corporations.  It is 
difficult to square the encyclopedia’s sweeping declarations with the cases it cited, the very 
first of which described a presumption against compensation when a municipal authority 
modifies an existing street to further the public’s use of it for ordinary highway purposes. 
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contrast, had not shown the court “a case holding that an abutting owner may be 
deprived of ingress and egress by means of a driveway to and from his property to 
the highway in front of it.”119   
Notably, too, the statute giving the commissioner authority to permit driveways 
specified his power to determine how they would be built: from this, the court 
inferred legislative intent that a permit “shall be allowed upon suitable regulations 
and conditions.”120  Accordingly, the court directed the commissioner to grant 
Goodfellow Tire a driveway permit, “subject to reasonable regulations and 
conditions as to number, location, plan of construction, and material used therein.”121 
Interestingly, in City of Detroit v. Grand Trunk Railroad, a case decided the 
same day as Goodfellow Tire, the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed that 
consequential injuries, resulting from a separation of grades that was done in 
accordance with statutory authority, do not constitute a taking of private property.122  
As Grand Trunk reasoned, while a city might be liable for acts taken without 
legislative authority, street improvements or changes made with legislative authority 
did not impose any liability “unless the legislature so declares.”123  As the court put 
it: “It seems to be unnecessary to say that the legislature has complete control over 
the highways of the State, that what is done in and upon them by lawful authority 
cannot be considered a nuisance, and that consequential injuries resulting from what 
is so done are damnum absque injuria.”124   
Accordingly, Goodfellow Tire is best understood as a decision regarding the 
extent of a municipal commissioner’s discretion under a particular permitting statute.  
Whether the Michigan legislature could have empowered the commissioner to allow 
vehicular access through the alley only, and to deny direct access to the boulevard, 
was not decided.   
B.  Access to an Abutting Street or to Each Abutting Street: 
The Brownlow and Wood Cases 
The expanding use of automobiles in the United States brought with it an equally 
growing demand for fuel and the rapid development of gasoline retailing.125  Motor 
fuel retailers quickly saw the advantages of a street-corner location: a site with 
                                                            
WILLIAM MACK, 28 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE, 863 n.24 (1908) (citing City of 
Denver v. Bayer, 2 P. 6 (Colo. 1883)).  In Bayer, the Colorado Supreme Court construed the 
new “taken or damaged” constitutional language as applying to a railroad in the street, but 
indicated that it should not affect most true street projects: “[W]e think that for injuries caused 
by a reasonable change or improvement of the street, by the [municipal] council, in a careful 
manner, the abutting owner should not recover.”  Bayer, 2 P. at 13.  
 119 Goodfellow Tire, 128 N.W. at 412. 
 120 Id. at 412-13. 
 121 Id. at 413. 
 122 In re City of Detroit, 128 N.W. 250, 253 (Mich. 1910).  The court decided Goodfellow 
Tire and City of Detroit on November 11, 1910. 
 123 Id.  
 124 Id.  The Latin phrase means “loss, hurt, or harm without injury in the legal sense.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990). 
 125 JOHN A. JAKLE & KEITH A. SCULLE, THE GAS STATION IN AMERICA 49-52, 58 (1994). 
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driveways to both streets provided many opportunities for cars to enter and exit the 
filling station.126  But easy access to the site would be useless if there were few 
customers, so locations on heavily-traveled streets were preferred.   
Yet this need for traffic brought its own set of problems.  In that day, busy streets 
had busy sidewalks, and autos crossing them posed a hazard to pedestrians.127  
Municipal governments also saw that vehicles entering and exiting gas stations could 
interfere with the flow of traffic on the street.128  These concerns sometimes led 
authorities to allow vehicles to cross the sidewalk on the least-used of the two 
abutting streets only, and to close off any driveways to the busier street.129  
Predictably, this kind of interference with customer traffic sometimes led to 
litigation. 
The Brownlow case, decided in 1921, dealt with a filling station at the corner of 
Fourteenth and Irving Streets in the District of Columbia.130  Fourteenth was a 
business street that had “a great deal of travel,” and concern for pedestrian safety led 
the District to close the driveway there, leaving the station with two entrances on the 
other street, Irving, which was residential in character and had less traffic.131   
The company obtained an injunction, convincing a court that the Irving Street 
entrances were not sufficient to accommodate the filling station’s customer traffic 
and, moreover, that “the right to maintain the Fourteenth street entrance is a valuable 
incorporeal right attached to the lot” that the District could not take away without 
paying just compensation.132 
Citing various authorities, including Goodfellow Tire, the appeals court agreed 
that the District had a right “to make reasonable regulations for the use of driveways 
across sidewalks.”133  But, the Brownlow court continued, “regulation is one thing, 
                                                            
 126 Id. at 210. 
 127 See, e.g., Oriental Oil Co. v. City of San Antonio, 208 S.W. 177, 181 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1918) (“[T]he conclusion that driving autos across the sidewalks will increase the hazard to 
pedestrians on those sidewalks is unquestionably true.”). 
 128 Id. (“The conclusion that street traffic will be blocked [by vehicles going to and from 
the gas station] is not clear.  The congestion at the intersection is due, primarily, to currents of 
traffic passing each other at right angles. . . .  It does not necessarily follow that to turn out of 
Travis street delays the current; on the contrary, it may hasten it by removing from it—
moving out can be effected as quickly as moving forward.”). 
 129 In the Oriental Oil case, the City of San Antonio enacted legislation declaring a gas 
station in the busy area at the corner of Travis and St. Mary’s streets to be a public nuisance 
and prohibiting any vehicles from crossing sidewalks in that area.  Id. at 178.  The Texas court 
recognized a property owner’s “inherent right to drive over the sidewalks for ingress and 
egress with vehicles for his private use and for the conduct of his business, provided that the 
use thus made of the sidewalks is reasonable,” and that the ordinance would eliminate that 
right.  Id. at 181.  But a nuisance is not a reasonable use: “If the conduct of the business is 
determined to be a menace to pedestrians or a nuisance to street traffic, the city cannot be 
estopped to abate it.”  Id. 
 130 Brownlow v. O’Donoghue Bros., Inc., 276 F. 636 (D.C. Cir. 1921). 
 131 Id. at 636-37. 
 132 Id. at 637. 
 133 Id. 
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and prohibition is another.”134  Depriving the filling station of any vehicular access to 
Fourteenth Street, in the court’s view, exceeded the bounds of permissible 
regulation.135   
And the station’s two remaining driveways to Irving Street did not make the 
regulation any more reasonable: “It needs no argument to show that an entrance to a 
place of business such as [the company] conducts from a street over which there is 
much travel is far more valuable than one from a street where the traffic is light.”136  
With this blended concept of access to the street and access to traffic in mind, the 
appeals court concluded that the company’s “right to access to and from Fourteenth 
street is a property right, which, though subject to legitimate regulation, cannot be 
taken from it without just compensation.”137 
Soon afterward the Virginia Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion, 
holding that the owner of a corner lot might be allowed access to just one abutting 
street.138  The 1927 decision in Wood v. City of Richmond involved a gas station built 
after the lot owner obtained a permit to construct driveways to Leigh Street and to 
Thirty-Fourth Street.139  A few months later, however, the city ordered removal of 
the Thirty-Fourth Street drive, stating that it violated the city’s zoning ordinance.140   
A chancery court entered an order temporarily restraining the city from removing 
the drive.141  The city moved to dissolve this injunction, contending that the permit 
had been issued without due consideration of the large volume of pedestrian and 
vehicular traffic on Thirty-Fourth Street which, in the opinion of the city’s public 
works director, made the driveway a safety hazard.142  The circuit court granted the 
motion, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the case.143 
On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court the property owner, Wood, asserted a 
right of access to each street abutting his lot.  Wood did not deny that the city had 
police power to control the traffic on its streets but contended that, as an abutter, he 
had “the right of access to his lot from Thirty-fourth street, as well as from Leigh 
street, and that such right is absolute and inherent.”144  Relying on a legal 
encyclopedia, Wood argued that, “‘An abutting land owner on a public highway has 
a special right of easement and use in the public road for access purposes, and this is 
                                                            
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 637-38. 
 136 Id. at 637. 
 137 Id. at 638. 
 138 Wood v. City of Richmond, 138 S.E. 560, 561 (Va. 1927). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id.  
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
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a property right which cannot be damaged or taken from him without just 
compensation.’”145 
The Virginia Supreme Court was not convinced that Wood had a right in the 
street superior to the public: 
While conceding the correctness of the proposition that an abutter has an 
easement in the public road which amounts to a property right, we are of 
the opinion that the exercise of this right is subordinate to the right of the 
municipality, derived by legislative authority, to so control the use of the 
streets as to promote the safety, comfort, health and general welfare of the 
public.146 
Given the evidence of heavy traffic on Thirty-Fourth Street and the presence of a 
bus stop there, the Virginia court concluded that the city had authority to close the 
driveway, and that its decision to do so was a reasonable exercise of the police 
power.147  
C.  Locating the Boundary Between Individual and Public Interests:  
The Pennsylvania Access Cases 
In 1913, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted a statute authorizing cities “‘to 
prevent . . . the passage of any vehicles drawn or self-propelled over and across 
sidewalks.”148  Twenty years later, the City of Reading offered this statute as its 
authority to enact ordinances prohibiting all private driveways within a nine-block 
area along Penn Street, one of the city’s busiest thoroughfares.149  These ordinances, 
which supported an earlier permit revocation, prevented the Farmers-Kissinger 
Market House from building a driveway across the sidewalk from Penn Street, 
through its market building, and to its parking garage on Cherry Street.150  
Significantly, the market and the garage already had vehicular access to Cherry 
Street.151   
                                                            
 145 Id. at 562 (quoting WILLIAM MACK, WILLIAM B. HALE & DONALD J. KISER, 29 CORPUS 
JURIS 547 (1922)).  Interestingly, Mack edited the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure quoted 
by the Michigan Supreme Court in Goodfellow Tire. Goodfellow Tire Co. v. Comm’r of Parks 
& Boulevards of Detroit, 128 N.W. 410, 412 (Mich. 1910).  Thomas Cooley, perhaps the best-
known treatise writer of the period, took a middle position.  In Cooley’s view, a proper 
exercise of governmental power that did not directly encroach on the property of an 
individual, such as a change in the grade of a city street that diminished the value of adjoining 
lots, was not a taking.  THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 781-84 (1903).  
But if the action deprived the owner of the ordinary use of his property by, for example, 
preventing any access from the lot to the highway, it was equivalent to a taking and entitled 
the owner to compensation.  Id. at 785 n.3, 787-88 n.2. 
 146 Wood, 138 S.E. at 562. 
 147 Id. at 563. 
 148 Farmers-Kissinger Mkt. House Co. v. Reading, 165 A. 398, 400 (Pa. 1933) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 149 Id. at 399-400. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 402. 
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had no problem concluding that Reading’s 
ordinances were within the city’s statutory authority.152  Even so, the company 
contended that the city’s exercise of that power was unconstitutional, depriving it of 
a valuable property right—the right of access—without due process of law.153 
The court readily agreed that the ordinances deprived the company of “a valuable 
interest or privilege” by preventing construction of a driveway across the sidewalk 
on Penn Street.154  But it rejected any idea that the company’s access right was 
paramount: “Community life requires some curtailment of the individual’s freedom 
in the use of his property.”155  Quoting the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s often-
cited 1851 opinion in Commonwealth v. Alger, it declared: “‘We think it is a settled 
principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of 
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the 
implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious . . . to the rights of the 
community.’”156 
As an abutting owner, the company did have a right of ingress and egress 
between Penn Street and its property, but the public also had a right to the 
reasonably unhindered use of Penn Street and the sidewalk in front of the market.157  
With two competing interests in the use of the street at stake, the court rhetorically 
asked: “Who locates the boundary line between the interests of the individual and the 
interests of the public?”158  The legislature, in the first instance, by enacting a general 
statute; afterward, the judiciary, determining in particular cases whether the statute 
was a reasonable exercise of the police power or an arbitrary infringement of 
individual rights.159 
Turning to the facts of the case before it, the court noted that the company 
already had vehicular access to its market and garage from Cherry Street.160  If the 
city were attempting to deny all vehicular access to the property “the reasonableness 
of its act might justly be questioned,” but as it was, the company sought additional 
access that would interfere with motor, street car, and pedestrian traffic on one of the 
busiest streets in the city.161  Under those circumstances, the court concluded that 
there was no due process violation: the purpose of the ordinances was valid, their 
means had a rational relation to the accomplishment of that purpose, and the 
interference with the company’s exercise of its property rights was “not arbitrary but 
clearly demanded by the public welfare.”162 
                                                            
 152 Id. at 401. 
 153 Id.   
 154 Id.   
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 54, 84-85 (1851)). 
 157 Id. at 401. 
 158 Id. at 402. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id.  
 161 Id. 
 162 Id.  
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In its 1938 decision in Breinig v. Allegheny County, by contrast, the Pennsylvania 
court was presented with a case in which all vehicular access was denied.163  The 
county had issued a curb-cut permit for two driveways between the Breinig property 
and the approach to a bridge over the Allegheny River but then, for reasons 
unexplained in the opinion, it revoked the permit and closed the driveways.164  
Although the bridge approach handled a fair number of vehicles, the local borough 
authorities did not believe that the driveways would adversely affect traffic on it.165  
So when the property owners sought injunctive relief the trial court granted it, 
holding that they “could not be deprived of vehicular access altogether” and ordering 
the county to “permit the maintenance of the driveways, subject to reasonable 
regulations.”166 
On review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarized that state’s law on the 
right of vehicular access in three propositions.  First, a municipality cannot 
“completely shut off an abutting owner’s access to his land” without condemnation.  
Second, in highly congested areas vehicular access can be reduced to a minimum, 
and even “be so limited as to exclude the right to maintain driveways immediately 
fronting the property, where it is possible to locate them elsewhere.”  Third, no 
matter what means of vehicular access is used, “care must be exercised to avoid 
danger to the traveling public.”167 
As it marked out the location of the boundary line between individual and public 
interests, the Breinig court cautioned that an abutting property owner “cannot make a 
business of his right of access in derogation of the rights of the traveling public.”168  
Instead, the abutter “is entitled to make only such use of his right of access as is 
consonant with traffic conditions and police requirements that are reasonable and 
uniform.”169   
Conversely, the court also warned that: “The absolute prohibition of driveways to 
an abutting owner’s land which fronts on a single thoroughfare, and which cannot be 
reached by any other means, is unlawful and will not be sustained.”170  Because 
traffic conditions on the bridge approach, according to the local borough authorities, 
“did not require an absolute prohibition of driveways” to the property, “a complete 
bar . . . was too extreme a measure.”171  Instead, the Breinig court believed that the 
                                                            
 163 Breinig v. Allegheny Cnty., 2 A.2d 842, 845 (Pa. 1938). 
 164 Id.  The property owners who obtained the driveway permit were a married couple.  Id. 
at 842-45.  They let their property to a chain grocery store under a lease that expressly 
provided for the driveways.  Id. at 845.  These facts suggest that the county may not have 
known the driveways were meant for commercial use until after the permit was issued.  
 165 Id.  
 166 Id.  
 167 Id.  
 168 Id. at 848. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 847-48. 
 171 Id. at 849. 
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county should adopt driveway regulations that would “accord some measure of 
access and yet permit public travel with a minimum of danger.”172 
As these Pennsylvania decisions illustrate, even in the 1930s courts saw that 
some balance had to be achieved between an abutter’s “right of access” and the 
“rights of the traveling public.”  Soon afterward, as the next part of this Article will 
show, an important federal study explored this problem and laid the theoretical 
groundwork for its solution.  The solution itself, however, would still be decades in 
the future.  
IV.  THE PUBLIC ROADS ADMINISTRATION’S 1947 STUDY OF HIGHWAY ACCESS AND 
ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT AND THE UNDERPINNINGS OF ACCESS MANAGEMENT 
By the 1940s the problems posed by unrestricted highway access, and the 
accompanying “strip” or “ribbon” type of roadside development, had become 
apparent.173  After thirty years of federal support to inter-city highway 
construction,174 the nation had developed a system of highways that would “permit 
traffic literally to fly between cities only to force it to crawl in spasms when it 
reaches the suburbs.”175  The U.S. Public Roads Administration’s 1947 study of this 
situation remarked that: “It is perhaps more startling than revealing to attribute a 
considerable share of present highway transport inadequacies to a single cause—the 
accessibility of a road or street to anybody who chooses to use it in a lawful 
manner.”176   
                                                            
 172 Id. at 848. 
 173 As a 1940 law review article noted: 
Various studies have shown that the numerous entrances to the highway, the frequent 
drawing in and out of the traffic stream, the parking, and the increased pedestrian 
traffic, all engendered by commercial use of the roadside, jointly conspire to reduce 
substantially the traffic capacity of the highway and to promote congestion, and to 
cause a large proportion of the highway accidents. 
Robert R. Bowie, Limiting Highway Access, 4 MD. L. REV. 219, 220 (1940). 
 174 The first federal highway-aid law, enacted in 1916, provided funding to those states that 
had highway departments.  A subsequent 1921 act created a primary road system, eligible for 
federal funding, which would consist of 7% of the rural highways in each state.  FED. 
HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PUBLICATION NO. FHWA-SA-93-049, 
HIGHWAY/UTILITY GUIDE 6 (1993). 
 175 DAVID R. LEVIN, PUB. ROADS ADMIN., PUBLIC CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS AND 
ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT 3 (1947).   
 176 Id. at 4-5.  Great Britain responded to this problem with its Restriction of Ribbon 
Development Act of 1935.  Id. at 2.  The British act not only required access permits for main 
roads, but also proscribed permits for any building construction (except for farm buildings) 
within 220 feet of the centerline of the road unless the highway authority consented to it.  Id. 
at 90-91.  The objective of the act was “to limit the uneconomic, linear expansion of 
enterprises and residences and thereby facilitate through traffic, increase highway capacity, 
promote safety, preserve the amenities of the countryside, and generally contribute toward 
more efficient transportation service.”  Id. at 11.  As one writer put it: 
Every time a bypass was built around a village, it seemed, new ‘ribbon’ or what 
Americans call ‘strip’ development would appear along the bypass, and traffic would 
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The federal study drew an important distinction between “land service” roads and 
“through” highways.  As the study noted, “Until the era of the motor vehicle, 
practically all highways and streets were utilized largely for access to farms and 
homes, factories and business establishments, and recreation facilities.”177  That 
access-providing function, the study explained, “is the concept of the ‘land service’ 
road.”178  But by the 1940s, “with millions of motor vehicles generating billions of 
miles of travel on millions of miles of road,” highway authorities had “learned that 
some highways must be designed and constructed not as ‘land service’ roads but as 
‘through’ highways which will facilitate the movement of large numbers of vehicles 
with a minimum of obstruction and a maximum of speed.”179 
Failure to properly classify roads by their primary functions, and then to apply 
access controls to roads intended to serve as “through” highways, caused a self-
defeating cycle where better roads brought more roadside development, which led to 
congestion and slowdowns caused by traffic turning on and off the road.  Many of 
the nation’s newer highways were of the latest engineering design, yet the study 
reported that “compelling evidence indicates that some of these roads will become 
functionally obsolescent long before they deteriorate physically.”180  Rapid 
functional obsolescence occurred “despite attempts at its correction because of the 
absence of effective control of access.”181 
In one example, the federal study described how quickly strip development made 
California State Route 26 obsolete: 
Within about 4 years after the establishment of this fine four-lane 
“superhighway” between Los Angeles and Pomona, a distance of 
approximately 30 miles, practically a continuous ribbon had developed so 
that a 25-mile speed limit had to be imposed for the greater portion of the 
route.182 
U.S. 1 in Maryland was another example of the strip development problem: 
In 1943, between Baltimore and Washington for a distance of 30.5 miles 
there were 618 commercial establishments and 665 residences, or one 
every 125 feet on the average, each with its own entrances and exits 
multiplying the traffic hazards, reducing highway capacity, and 
precipitating congestion. . . .  This section of US 1 is one of the most 
dangerous and congested roads in the country.183 
                                                            
quickly fill the road . . . .  [T]he argument . . . that new highways ‘induce’ traffic was 
already in use at least as early as the 1920s in Britain. 
ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY 119-20 (2005). 
 177 LEVIN, supra note 175, at 5. 
 178 Id.   
 179 Id. 
 180 Id.  
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 6. 
 183 Id. 
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It should be noted that, at the time of the 1947 federal study, modern limited-
access highways were in their earliest formative stages.  Parkways, intended largely 
for recreational purposes and off-limits to commercial traffic, had existed in a 
handful of states for perhaps twenty years.184  Because the land along a parkway was 
acquired as a public park, access points to the road could be limited by the parkway 
authority.185  A few expressways or freeways, open to trucks as well as cars, had also 
recently been built, mostly in large urban areas.186  The longest of these, Outer Drive 
in Chicago, had a planned length of twenty-five miles.187  When those facilities were 
built, any access rights of abutting owners were also acquired.188 
The study reported that between 1937 and 1947, only twenty-four states had 
enacted legislation allowing the creation of limited-access highways.189  Congress, 
however, had signaled that the planned National System of Interstate Highways 
would include access restrictions,190 and the study was meant to provide guidance 
(and impetus) to the remaining states to enact appropriate enabling legislation. 
As it turned out, the highways of the Interstate system were created exclusively 
as “through” highways and built to a design standard that allows access at road 
interchanges only.191  Access is so closely controlled that even the construction of a 
                                                            
 184 Id. at 14, 16, 41.  The Bronx River Parkway, in New York, was the first highway 
designed for cars.  Design work began in 1906, but the parkway was not fully opened for auto 
traffic until 1924.  Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural 
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
699, 741 (1993). 
 185 LEVIN, supra note 175, at 16.  See, e.g., Burke v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 159 N.E. 739, 
740 (Mass. 1928) (roadways constructed in a park are not public ways; abutters of the park 
have no access rights to the parkway). 
 186 LEVIN, supra note 175, at 16, 40. 
 187 Id. at 40.  The Willow Run Expressway system, built to serve the B-24 bomber plant 
near Ypsilanti, Michigan, joined the Detroit Industrial Expressway, which led to industrial 
areas on the southern edge of Detroit.  The combined mileage of both systems was about 38 
miles.  Id. at 40; see also U.S. 12/Ford Exit Dr. South Bend, MICH. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (2012), 
http://www.michigan.gov/mdot/0,1607,7-151-9620_11154_11188-28776--,00.html.  Other 
expressways built to serve national defense needs included the network around the Pentagon 
(12.7 miles) and a freeway from Colorado Springs to Fort Carson, Colorado.  LEVIN, supra 
note 175, at 40. 
 188 LEVIN, supra note 175, at 16.  These freeways were “the next step in the development of 
access control techniques, moving from using landscaped park strips to protect the expressway 
(1914) to using the acquisition of private property access rights by recorded deed to restrict 
direct access.”  PHILIP DEMOSTHENES, ACCESS MANAGEMENT POLICIES: AN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 2 (1999), available at http://www.accessmanagement.info/pdf/ 
History_of_AM.pdf. 
 189 LEVIN, supra note 175, at 19-20. 
 190 Id. at 42. 
 191 Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, FED. 
HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.cfm.  Federal law mandated the acquisition 
of access rights for all highways on the Interstate system.  DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 
3. 
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new interchange requires a daunting amount of engineering study and justification.192  
Because the Interstates (and similar freeways and expressways) were designed for 
mobility only, and not for land access, any access rights of abutting landowners were 
permanently acquired (and extinguished) when the highway was built.  A 
consideration of those roadways, to which access from abutting properties is not 
merely regulated but permanently precluded, is outside the scope of this Article.  But 
the Public Roads Administration’s 1947 study is significant for other reasons.   
First, it reflects an important insight into how the function of roads had changed 
in the automotive age.  In the era of horse-drawn vehicles, there was no evident 
conflict between access and mobility: the same road could serve both purposes.193  
But the widespread use of automobiles meant that many more vehicles were using 
the roadways, and moving at much higher speeds.  When those same roadways also 
provided access to each parcel of abutting land, no matter how small the parcels and 
how short the intervals between driveways, a conflict developed.  Traffic volume, 
traffic speed, and abundant driveways and intersections did not mix: one of the three 
had to go.  Since traffic volume was not about to lessen, either traffic speed or the 
number of conflicting access points had to be reduced.  
Second, the study revealed that even in the 1940s public planners saw that road 
building, by itself, could not permanently solve traffic problems.  Although wider 
pavement and more lanes might improve the situation, roadside development—and 
the conflicting cross-currents of vehicles entering and leaving those properties—
would soon reduce the road’s traffic-handling capacity. 
Third, the study showed that roads could be classified along a continuum, with 
primary highways (mostly for mobility) at one end and land service roads (mostly 
for access) at the other.194  Between these poles, there existed an extensive web of 
secondary highways and streets allowing traffic to flow between the primary and 
land service roads.  These secondary roadways, the study indicated, would benefit 
from application of access-control devices such as land-use controls and, in rural 
areas, restrictions on ribbon development.195 
Interestingly, too, the study observed a connection between public investment in 
road transportation and the enhancement of private real estate values.  Traffic 
congestion in cities was a critical problem, but transportation betterments were often 
unaffordable because of high land costs—yet those property values would not have 
existed but for the network of roads.  As the study’s reporting author remarked, “It is 
                                                            
 192 Notice of Revised Policy Statement, Access to the Interstate System, 74 Fed. Reg. 
43,743 (2009).  One item to be considered in an interchange justification study is whether the 
functioning of local roads and streets can be improved, by means such as access control, to 
accommodate the traffic demand.  Id. at 43,744. 
 193 As the Wisconsin Supreme Court described it, 
In early times, local roads were constructed for the improvement of property and in 
many instances the land was dedicated for such purpose and the road was paid for by 
local real-estate taxes or by special assessments.  The concept of access rights in that 
context was not greatly influenced by the needs of the public generally which might 
clash with an unrestricted use of the property in relation to the abutting street. 
Stefan Auto Body v. State Highway Comm’n, 124 N.W.2d 319, 323-24 (Wis. 1963). 
 194 LEVIN, supra note 175, at 12. 
 195 Id. 
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ironic to think that many sorely needed public improvements have been rendered 
impossible by the ‘land values’ which the public itself has created.”196 
It would take time, however, for these insights to make their way into general 
practice.  By the late 1940s, many courts had confirmed that state governments could 
use their police powers to control access to highways “to achieve public safety and 
protect the functional integrity of the highway.”197  Nonetheless, “[w]hile there was a 
strong commitment to use [the states’] access control authority for the national 
interstate system, the application of access control to the majority of the public 
roadway system as an engineering and safety element was for the most part 
ignored.”198  Driveway permits did include design and construction standards, and a 
permit application might be denied if the proposed location was one where a driver 
could not see far enough to safely enter the road, but otherwise “[d]riveways and 
intersections were simply built wherever someone wanted one.  Connections were 
not a roadway design consideration for engineers.”199  
Ten years later the effects of this policy—or lack of policy—began to draw some 
professional attention.  A 1957 study done for the Highway Research Board 
                                                            
 196 Id. at 4 n.3. 
 197 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 4.  In addition to the cases discussed in Part II, supra, 
by the late 1940s the high courts of several other states had acknowledged the public’s right to 
regulate access.  See, e.g., Denman v. City of Tacoma, 268 P. 1043, 1044-45 (Wash. 1928) 
(because property had reasonable access to one street, city’s continuing regulatory power over 
the use of its streets allowed it to revoke permit for a drive to another street); Kaszer v. City of 
Morgantown, 152 S.E. 747, 747 (W. Va. 1930) (reversing writ of mandamus that ordered city 
to remove curbing: “Manifestly the protection of life and limb and the safe, free and 
convenient use of the public streets by all are matters are matters of public concern and there 
is both a power and [an] obligation on the part of the public authorities to pass and enforce 
reasonable police provisions for this purpose.”) (internal citation omitted); Jones Beach 
Boulevard Estate, Inc. v. Moses, 197 N.E. 313, 315 (N.Y. 1935) (“The [access] rights of an 
abutter are subject to the right of the State to regulate and control the public highways for the 
benefit of the traveling public.”); McGowan v. City of Burns, 137 P.2d 994, 999 (Or. 1943) 
(“The right of access to and egress from a public street is subject to the public’s superior rights 
and to public regulation.”); Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 24 N.W.2d 244, 248, 251-52 
(Minn. 1946) (city council could deny curb cut where evidence at council hearing showed it 
would be a traffic hazard: “[M]unicipalities possess extensive and drastic police powers with 
respect to the care, supervision, and control of streets.”).  Even decisions that did not uphold 
particular regulations still agreed that the government could regulate access.  See, e.g., R.G. 
Lydy, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 190 N.E. 273, 277 (Ill. 1934) (“The city council may exercise a 
reasonable supervision over the construction and maintenance of driveway across sidewalks” 
but the ordinance in question was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.); City of 
Norman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 145 P.2d 765, 765-67 (Okla. 1944) (trial court did not err in 
issuing injunction to allow driveway; evidence that driveway was a traffic hazard was 
conflicting: “No case is cited, and we have found none, holding that an abutting owner may be 
entirely deprived of his right of ingress and egress to the street under reasonable 
regulations.”); Newman v. Mayor of Newport, 57 A.2d 173, 179-80 (R.I. 1948) (city had the 
power to regulate driveways for traffic safety, and properly authorized the commissioner of 
public works to rule on curb cut applications “so that conflicting public and private rights 
might be fairly adjusted by governmental control and regulation,” but commissioner’s 
decision was not reasonable because it effectively barred any commercial use of the property). 
 198 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 4. 
 199 Id. 
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concluded that there was a direct relationship between the number of access points 
and the number of accidents on highways with similar traffic levels.200  The study’s 
author also concluded that the number of accidents increased as drivers were 
presented with more situations requiring a decision, such as the presence of a turning 
vehicle.201  This was “one of the earliest conclusions that driver workload, caused in 
part by the frequency of access-related turning movements, is a strong contributing 
factor in accident potential on busy highways.”202 
Soon afterward, in 1960, the American Association of State Highway Officials 
published a document providing guidance on how to create appropriate regulations 
for driveways along major highways.203  In addition to providing design criteria, the 
guide recommended use of access controls to lessen interference with traffic flow: 
“Most of the interference originates in vehicle movements to and from 
businesses, residences or other development along the highways.  
Accordingly, regulations and overall control of driveway connections are 
necessary to provide efficient and safe operations, and to utilize the full 
potential of the highway investment.  It is proper that some control be 
exercised over the number, location, and general design features of 
driveways between the highway and adjacent private property.”204 
A decade later, in 1971, the National Cooperative Highway Research Program 
(NCHRP) issued a report on its study of the relationship between transportation and 
land use in which it concluded: 
“The lack of access control along arterial highways has been the largest 
single factor contributing to the obsolescence of highway facilities.  
Inadequate access control has resulted in the functional obsolescence of 
an entire generation of new arterial facilities built only a short while 
ago.”205 
The report also noted that access controls were most critically needed in urban 
areas, “where land development intensity, congestion, and accident potential are 
greatest.”206  Even so, few cities had even tried to control access to their arterial 
                                                            
 200 Id. at 5 (citing DAVID SCHOPPERT, PREDICTING TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS FROM ROADWAY 
ELEMENTS OF RURAL TWO-LANE HIGHWAYS WITH GRAVEL SHOULDERS, HIGHWAY RESEARCH 
BULLETIN NO. 158 (1957)). 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. (citing AMERICAN ASS’N OF STATE HIGHWAY OFFICIALS, AN INFORMATIONAL GUIDE 
FOR PREPARING PRIVATE DRIVEWAY REGULATIONS FOR MAJOR HIGHWAYS (1960) [hereinafter 
INFORMATIONAL GUIDE]). 
 204 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 5 (quoting INFORMATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 203).  
The AASHO guide’s recommendations were no novel enlargement of governmental power:  
the 1910 Goodfellow Tire decision agreed that a state could delegate to a commissioner 
authority to issue driveway permits “subject to reasonable regulations and conditions as to 
number, location, plan of construction, and material used therein.” Goodfellow Tire Co. v. 
Comm’r of Parks and Boulevards of Detroit, 128 N.W. 410, 413 (Mich. 1910). 
 205 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 5 (quoting NCHRP, supra note 8, at 46).  
 206 NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 8, at 48. 
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streets: “These uncontrolled access facilities are subject to the same deteriorating 
influences that have caused the obsolescence of most of the arterial facilities 
constructed in the last 50 years.”207 
Indeed, the NCHRP report’s conclusion—that proliferating access points 
damaged the traffic-handling capabilities of highways intended for large volumes of 
fast-moving vehicles—mirrored the Public Roads Administration’s study from a 
generation earlier.  Nonetheless, it was not until 1979 that Colorado became the first 
state to legislate a comprehensive program for managing access to all state 
highways.208  The following section of this Article describes the Colorado program, 
along with those of Florida and New Jersey, and delineates the important principles 
that they (and other states’ access management programs) have in common. 
V.  MODERN ACCESS MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS: SOME BRIEF SKETCHES 
A.  Colorado 
Colorado’s pioneering state-wide access management law took four important 
steps:   
First, to maintain smooth traffic flow on state highways and protect their 
functional level, the Colorado legislature made each state highway a “controlled-
access highway” to which abutting property owners had a right of access only where 
permitted, under the state highway access code, by the public authority having 
jurisdiction over it.209   
Second, the legislature stated that owners of lands abutting state highways had a 
right of “reasonable access to the general street system” but no right of direct access 
to the state highway itself.210   
Third, it directed the state transportation commission to base the access code’s 
rules on considerations such as highway traffic volume, the functional classification 
of the highway, local land use plans and zoning, the type and volume of traffic that 
would be using the driveway for which a permit is sought, and the availability of 
vehicular access from local streets rather than a state highway.211   
Fourth, the legislature allowed existing driveways to remain, but specified that 
their owners might have to relocate or reconstruct them to conform to the access 
code if “a change in the use of the property . . .  results in a change in the type of 
                                                            
 207 Id. 
 208 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 6. 
 209 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 43-2-147(1)(a),  42-1-102(18) (2010). 
 210 COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(1)(b)-(c) (2010).  The only abutting uses having a right of 
direct access to state highways are police, fire, ambulance, and other emergency stations.  Id.  
To make sure that local land development decisions were consistent with the new law, the 
legislature also required connections to the state highway system, as laid out in new 
subdivision plats, to comply with the access code.  COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(1)(b) (2010). 
 211 COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(4) (2010). 
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driveway operation.”212  Whether relocation or reconstruction is necessary would “be 
determined by reference to the standards set forth in the access code.”213 
The central element of the access code’s regulatory framework in Colorado, as in 
other states, is the categorization of each highway (or segment of a highway) based 
on its function, current and projected.  How a given roadway will be categorized 
depends on factors such as the speed and volume of traffic and how far it is 
traveling—regionally, between cities, or within the local area.  As those factors 
increase, the allowable number of intersecting driveways will decrease, and the 
design requirements for the ones that are allowed will become more demanding.  
The category decision is made by the Colorado Department of Transportation in 
consultation with local governments and planning organizations, and if those parties 
cannot reach a consensus, the matter is decided by the state Transportation 
Commission in a rule-making hearing.214 
A road intended for local traffic, for example, might be categorized as a frontage 
road where “[a]ccess needs . . . take priority over through traffic movements” and 
each parcel of land is normally granted at least one full-movement, unsignalized 
driveway.215  By contrast, a road intended for high traffic volumes over relatively 
long distances might be classed as a principal highway, on which “[d]irect access 
service to abutting land is subordinate to providing service to through traffic 
movements.”216  Direct access to one of these highways is allowed only if there is no 
reasonable access by the local street system.  Any driveway that is allowed may have 
to serve multiple properties, probably will not have left-turn access unless the 
location is appropriate for a traffic signal,217 and will need to have a right turn 
deceleration lane if the projected peak volume of traffic using the driveway is greater 
than 25 vehicles per hour.218 
Driveway traffic volume is also pivotal.  No matter what functional category the 
highway has, if a driveway is expected to handle 100 vehicles per hour or more,219 a 
                                                            
 212 COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(6)(a)-(b) (2010).  If changes in road or traffic conditions, 
rather than a change in the use of the property, spurred the need to relocate or reconstruct an 
existing drive, the work would be done at the Department of Transportation’s expense. 
 213 COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-147(6)(b) (2010). 
 214 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-2.2 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 215 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-3.13 (LexisNexis 2010).  “Full movement” means that right 
and left turns can be made into and out of the driveway.   
 216 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-3.10 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 217 Id.  In Magness v. State of Colorado, the court upheld the highway department’s 
decision (under an earlier version of the code) to permit a driveway that allowed only right-
turn access because the applicant did not prove his application qualified for full-movement 
access under the criteria set forth in the code.  Magness v. State, 844 P.2d 1304, 1307-08 
(Colo. App. 1992). 
 218 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-3.10 (LexisNexis 2010).  Traffic signals are allowed only if 
there is good signal progression—that is, if the signals can be “timed” to allow efficient 
movement of through traffic. Id.    
 219 The code refers to a design hourly volume (DHV) of 100 vehicles or more.  2 COLO. 
CODE REGS. § 601-2.3(5) (LexisNexis 2010).  DHV is “an hourly traffic volume determined 
for use in the geometric design of highways. It is the 30th highest hour vehicular volume 
experienced in a one year period.”  2 COLO. CODE REGS. 601-1.5 (2010). 
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permit applicant must conduct a traffic impact study.  The study must include 
analysis of projected traffic volumes for the development site and the study area; 
reasonable access alternatives (including one with no direct highway access); 
projected turn lane queue lengths; proximity of other access points; the ability of the 
roadway system to handle increased traffic; and the ability to synchronize any 
proposed turn signal with other signals in the area.220  For existing “grandfathered” 
driveways, 100 vehicles per day is a relevant threshold: a change in use that 
increases volume above that level, or increases traffic volume to the site by twenty 
percent or more, may trigger application of the code’s requirements.221  
The Colorado access code also specifies many driveway location standards.  
Notably, the standard for access spacing requires driveways to be separated by a 
distance equal to or greater than the design sight distance applicable to the highway 
in question.222  On a typical arterial highway with a posted speed limit of fifty miles 
per hour, the design sight distance standard would require at least 475 feet between 
driveways.223 
B.  Florida 
Florida’s “State Highway System Access Management Act” took effect in July, 
1988.224  The Florida legislature prefaced its Act with several findings.  First, that it 
was necessary to regulate access to the state highway system to protect the public 
safety and welfare, promote the efficient movement of people and goods, and 
“preserve the functional integrity of the State Highway System.”225  Second, that an 
access management program would help coordinate the land use planning decisions 
of local governments with the investments made in the state highway system, and 
that “unregulated access to the State Highway System is one of the contributing 
factors to the congestion and functional deterioration of the system.”226  Third, that 
an access management program would benefit the public by increasing the traffic-
carrying capacity of the state highway system, reducing accidents and highway 
                                                            
 220 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-2.3(5) (LexisNexis 2010). 
 221 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-2.6(3) (LexisNexis 2010).   
 222 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 601-4.4 (LexisNexis 2010).  This required spacing ensures that a 
driver in the right lane of the road, coming up on a driveway with a vehicle in it, will have an 
unobstructed view that is far enough to react to a vehicle entering the road at the next 
driveway.  The design sight distance standard is related to stopping sight distance, which is 
“distance required by a driver of a vehicle, traveling at a given speed, to bring the vehicle to a 
stop after an object on the roadway becomes visible. It includes the distance traveled during 
driver perception and reaction times and the vehicle braking distance.”  2 COLO. CODE REGS. 
601-1.5(78) (2010).  Adequate design sight distance means that the driver has enough space 
(and time) to see, react to, and stop for another vehicle. 
 223 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 601-1-4.3(1)-(2) (2010). 
 224 Kunnen v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 01-0009, 2001 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 3051, at 
*5 (Dec. 14, 2001). 
 225 FLA. STAT. § 335.181(1)(a) (2010). 
 226 FLA. STAT. § 335.181(1)(b) (2010). 
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maintenance costs, promoting economic growth, and lengthening the effective life of 
the state’s transportation facilities.227 
Accordingly, the legislature directed the Florida Department of Transportation 
(FDOT) to develop an access control classification system for all routes on the state 
highway system, with a coordinated set of access management standards to be used 
in planning access to state highways and evaluating permit applications.228  Florida’s 
highways would be classified based on their function, traffic volume, and other 
factors, with the Department making a final decision after notice, public meetings, 
and coordination with local government entities.229  The access management 
standards, according to the legislature’s direction, would set criteria for the spacing, 
location, design, and construction of connections to the state highway system, for 
safety factors, for the use of traffic control devices, and similar matters.230   
The act also empowered FDOT to regulate all vehicular access and connections 
to the state highway system through a new permitting procedure it was ordered to 
adopt.231  Driveways not covered by earlier permit laws would be allowed to remain 
in service, but a permit would be required if there was a significant change in use, 
design, or traffic flow of the connection.232  Previously permitted driveways also 
could remain, subject to permit modification or revocation (after notice and a 
hearing) if a “significant change” occurred.233  This meant that whenever additional 
traffic was projected due to an expansion or redevelopment, the permit holder must 
ask FDOT to determine if a new permit application would be required.234 
Florida’s highway classification system, like Colorado’s, depends in part on how 
much a given roadway is used by through traffic.235  Florida’s system also depends 
on the amount of development in the area served by the roadway: the most restrictive 
access categories are for highways in “areas without existing extensive 
development,” while the least restrictive categories relate to places with “moderate 
to extensive development.”236  On a typical arterial highway with a posted speed 
limit of fifty miles per hour, connections such as driveways and streets must be 
spaced at least 440 feet apart, while median openings and traffic signals must be a 
                                                            
 227 See FLA. STAT. § 335.181(1)(c) (2010). 
 228 FLA. STAT. § 335.188(1)-(2) (2010). 
 229 See FLA. STAT. § 335.188(3) (2010); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.004 (2010). 
 230 See FLA. STAT. § 335.188(3) (2010). 
 231 See FLA. STAT. §§ 335.182-.1825 (2010). 
 232 FLA. STAT. § 335.187(1) (2010); FLA. STAT. § 335.182(3)(b) (2010) (defining 
“Significant change” as “a change in the use of the property, including land, structures or 
facilities, or an expansion of the size of the structures or facilities causing an increase in the 
trip generation of the property exceeding 25 percent more trip generation (either peak hour or 
daily) and exceeding 100 vehicles per day more than the existing use.”); FLA. STAT. § 
335.182(3)(a) (2010) (defining “Connection” as “driveways, streets, turnouts, or other means 
of providing for the right of reasonable access to or from the State Highway System.”). 
 233 See FLA. STAT. § 335.187(2) (2010). 
 234 See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.005(2) (2010). 
 235 See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.003(2)(b) (2010). 
 236 Id. 
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half-mile apart.237  For the least restricted roadways, “where there is little intent or 
opportunity to provide high speed travel,” connections may be as close together as 
125 feet, and signals may be a quarter-mile apart.238 
As in Colorado, the complexity of the permit application process depends on the 
number of daily vehicle trips expected at the site.  If that number exceeds 601, the 
application must include estimated trip generation data, a site plan, information 
about the abutting roads and nearby connections, location and design information for 
each connection to be permitted, and a detailed traffic study.239 
In addition to its findings, the Florida legislature made a policy declaration: that a 
property owner “has a right to reasonable access to the abutting state highway but 
does not have the right of unregulated access to such highway.”240  “Reasonable 
access” was left undefined, but the legislature signaled that it does not have to be 
direct access,241 especially if a service road is built.242  The Florida Administrative 
Code later defined “reasonable access” as “the minimum number of connections, 
direct or indirect, necessary to provide safe and efficient ingress and egress to the 
State Highway System based on [the access management act], the Access 
Management Classification, projected connection and roadway traffic volumes, and 
the type and intensity of the land use.”243 
                                                            
 237 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.003(1) (2010) (using an Access Class 5 roadway as an 
example). 
 238 Id.; FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.003(2)(b)(6) (2010) (referring to an Access Class 
7 roadway). 
 239 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-96.005(4) (2010); see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-
96.002(35) (2010) (Here a “trip” is defined as a one way vehicle movement, so each time a 
customer visits an establishment in a car, there are two trips: one in and one out. A business 
that is open twelve hours and serves twenty-five customers per hour would generate 600 trips 
(300 in and 300 out)). 
 240 FLA. STAT. § 335.181(2)(a) (2010).   
 241 See FLA. STAT. § 335.181(6) (2010) (“The denial of reasonable direct access to an 
abutting state highway [in the administrative permitting process] is not compensable under the 
provisions of this act unless the denial would be otherwise compensable absent the provisions 
of this act.”). 
 242 See FLA. STAT. § 335.181(7) (2010) (encouraging construction of service roads that 
provide reasonable access to state highways: “[N]othing in this act requires that a property 
owner whose land abuts a service road be given direct access across the service road to the 
state highway.”). 
 243 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 14-97.002(25) (2010) (emphasis added); see also Racetrac 
Petroleum, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 94-6741RP, 1995 Fla. Div. Adm. Hear. LEXIS 4874, 
at *18-19 (Apr. 27, 1995) (stating that gas station and restaurant owners challenged the rule’s 
equivalent treatment of direct and indirect access and argued that FDOT lacked authority “to 
consider either alternate or joint access as reasonable access”); id. at *19-20 (explaining the 
hearing officer’s disagreement, and holding that indirect access could be reasonable: “No firm 
and fast formula for determining the reasonableness of access has been devised. Direct access 
is easy to determine. It is a connection which joins the highway directly. However, there are 
other means of providing access. These may include access gained by connection to a side 
street which directly connects with the highway, or the use of a joint easement or a service 
road and are called indirect access. In determining whether indirect access can constitute 
reasonable access, many factors . . . must be considered.”). 
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One form of access connection is the shared or joint-use driveway.  Florida’s 
legislature has encouraged property owners to “implement the use of joint access 
where legally available”244 and the state’s courts have upheld FDOT’s power to 
require a joint-use driveway as a condition of permit approval.245  The legislature has 
also encouraged the use of service roads to provide reasonable access to state 
highways.246  So long as a service road provides access suitable to the property’s 
type of development, Florida courts have found it to be a legally sufficient substitute 
for direct access to an abutting state highway.247 
C.  New Jersey 
New Jersey’s 1989 State Highway Access Management Act, like its Florida 
counterpart, begins with several important legislative findings and declarations.  
First, the purpose of the state highway system is to serve as a network of principal 
arterial routes, and it is an irreplaceable public asset that was built at great public 
expense.  Second, land development and unrestricted access to state highways can 
impair this purpose and damage the public investment in the highway system.  Third, 
every owner of property abutting a public road has “a right of reasonable access to 
the general system of streets and highways” but not to a particular means of access; 
and while government regulation may not eliminate all access to the general street 
system without providing just compensation, access to a state highway is subordinate 
to the public’s right and interest in a safe and efficient highway.  Fourth, access 
management regulations are needed to protect the functional integrity of the state 
highway system and the public investment in the system.248   
Like Colorado’s and Florida’s programs, New Jersey’s access management code 
is based on a classification of highways by function, with attention to “the 
                                                            
 244 FLA. STAT. § 335.181(2)(b) (2010). 
 245 See Paradyne Corp. v. State, 528 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding 
that FDOT could require Paradyne’s drive connection to an arterial road to provide access to a 
neighboring property as well); see also id. at 926-27 (stating that FDOT could not make 
Paradyne build a joint-use driveway on its own private property, but it could make the shared 
driveway a condition precedent to an access permit, since the evidence showed that separate 
driveways would be unsafe and impractical; and adding that if  Paradyne would not accept 
that condition, then FDOT could deny access to the arterial road, and Paradyne (and the 
neighboring property) would be relegated to use of the “alternate available accesses to their 
properties”). 
 246 FLA. STAT. § 335.181(7) (2010). 
 247 Where Florida courts draw the line on this issue is somewhat unclear.  It seems safe to 
say that if a commercial property loses its only direct access to an abutting main road, and the 
substitute access is through residential streets, a substantial loss of access (and a taking of a 
property right) occurs.  See Palm Beach Cnty. v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 847-50 (Fla. 1989).  
But service road access can adequately replace direct highway access if the new travel path to 
and from the property seems reasonable to the court.  See Dep’t of Transp. v. Fisher, 958 So. 
2d 586, 590-93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that the service road did not cause a 
“substantial loss of access”); accord Kunnen v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 01-0009, 2001 Fla. Div. 
Adm. Hear. LEXIS 3051, at *21-23, 33-34 (Dec. 14, 2001) (explaining that the service road 
did not cause a substantial loss of access where the new travel path involved two service 
roads). 
 248 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-90 (West 2010). 
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appropriate and desirable balance between facilitating safe and convenient 
movement of through traffic and providing direct access to abutting property.”249  
For each classification, the code contains standards for geometric design and 
minimum and desirable spacing criteria for driveways and intersections.250  New 
subdivisions of land abutting state highways must comply with the access code;251 
existing permitted driveways are allowed to remain in place, but if an expansion or 
change in use will result in a significant increase in traffic (an additional ten percent 
of daily traffic or one hundred movements during the peak hour, whichever is 
greater), a new permit and compliance with the access code are required.252 
Access management rules are most readily applied to new development.  As an 
older and more densely populated state, however, New Jersey faced a greater 
problem in “retrofitting” its regulations to existing development.  The legislature 
addressed this problem in three novel ways.   
First, it declared that areas with “extensive commercial activity oriented toward 
and dependent upon a State highway should not be classified by reason of that level 
of activity as urban environments for access management purposes.”253  Instead, if an 
area of highway-oriented business was “characterized by excessive driveway 
openings, excessive traffic congestion, excessive accident rates, or undesirably low 
average rates of speed” then New Jersey Department of Transportation (NJDOT) 
should manage the highway within that area “to mitigate these nuisances.”254 
Second, the legislature authorized the commissioner of transportation to issue 
nonconforming-lot access permits that would include limits on the maximum 
vehicular use of any driveway built or operated under the permit.255  The act also 
called for the adoption of “alternative design standards for each highway 
classification which, combined with limits on vehicular use, can be applied to lots 
which were in existence prior to the adoption of the access code” and cannot meet 
the code’s standards.256 
Third, it empowered the commissioner to revoke an access permit (after notice 
and a hearing) if “alternative access” is available and the revocation would be 
                                                            
 249 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-91(b) (West 2010); see generally N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:7-
91(a)-(i) (West 2010) (stating that the access code and classifications were developed after 
public hearings, with the input of members of the legislature, and under the guidance of an 
advisory committee appointed by the governor that included members recommended by the 
legislature, a traffic engineer, two developers, and representatives of business and industry).   
 250 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-91(c) (West 2010). 
 251 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-96 (West 2010). 
 252 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 27:7-92(d), 7-95 (West 2010). 
 253 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-90(i) (West 2010). 
 254 Id. 
 255 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-93 (West 2010) (ensuring that, if a driveway cannot be 
located to meet the access code’s requirements because the lot it is too narrow or located too 
close to an intersection, the parcel will not be landlocked); Jerome G. Rose, Regulating the 
Use of Land Abutting State Highways: New Jersey’s State Highway Access Management Act, 
18 REAL EST. L.J. 288, 292 (1990) (discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-93 (West 1990)). 
 256 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-91(c) (West 2010). 
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consistent with the purposes of the access management act.257  For properties zoned 
or used for residential or agricultural purposes, a connection to any improved public 
street or highway that provides reasonable access to the general system of streets and 
highways is deemed “alternative access.”258  If the property is zoned or used for 
industrial purposes, a connection to an access road is sufficient, but it must be “of 
sufficient design to support necessary truck and employee access as required by the 
industry.”259  Properties zoned or used for commercial purposes may connect to “any 
parallel or perpendicular street, highway, easement, service road or common 
driveway” provided the roadway’s design is sufficient to support commercial traffic 
and will give motorists “a convenient, direct, and well-marked means of both 
reaching the business or use and returning to the highway.”260   
The alternative access must be open for use before the commissioner can revoke 
a permit.261  In addition, the state must pay for engineering costs; construction work 
associated with the change such as installing new access drives and removing old 
ones, improving on-site circulation to accommodate the new drive locations, and 
replacing signs; and obtaining any needed land or property rights.262  Finally, the act 
authorized the commissioner, and county and municipal governments, to “build new 
roads or acquire access easements to provide alternative access to existing developed 
lots which have no other means of access except to a State highway.”263 
New Jersey’s courts have sustained these provisions of the act, but have reached 
somewhat different results about how to decide whether “alternative access” is 
acceptable under the statutory standards.  If no land is taken from the abutting 
owner, the decision is made and reviewed administratively, and any judicial review 
is made with deference to the administrative findings and decisions.264  In that setting 
the appeals court actually used heightened deference, reasoning that application of 
the access management code required highly technical knowledge within the area of 
expertise that the legislature had specifically assigned to NJDOT.265  When land is 
taken from the abutter, however, exhaustion of administrative remedies has not been 
                                                            
 257 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(a) (West 2010); see also In re I/M/O Route 206 at Lot 13B 
New Amwell, 731 A.2d 56, 61 (N.J. 1999) (Closing one driveway onto a state highway, when 
another point of direct access to the highway remains open, is considered to be a 
“modification” of access and not the revocation of an access permit.).   
 258 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(c)(3) (West 2010). 
 259 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(c)(2) (West 2010). 
 260 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(c)(1) (West 2010) (including wholesale, retail, service, and 
office uses in the commercial category, along with residential developments “in excess of four 
residential units per acre with a total acreage of 25 or more acres”). 
 261 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-94(d) (West 2010). 
 262 Id. 
 263 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 27:7-97 (West 2010). 
 264 See In the Matter of the Revocation of the Access of Block No. 1901, Lot No. 1, 
Borough of Paramus, Bergen Cnty. Parkway 17 Assoc.,735 A.2d 594, 597, 601 (N.J. 1999) 
[hereinafter Parkway 17]. 
 265 Id. at 601-02. 
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required: the jury in the eminent domain case, as fact-finder, may decide whether the 
alternative access is reasonable.266 
D.  An Overview of Typical Access Management Principles 
State and local governments continue to adopt access management programs.  
Some are based on new enabling legislation like Virginia’s 2007 access management 
act;267 others, like Indiana’s 2009 Access Management Guide, are administrative 
rules or policies issued under the state transportation department’s existing authority 
to regulate and control state highways.268  Certain key principles, however, are held 
in common. 
The first is classification of roadways by their intended function.  The 
categorization is made using measurable criteria such as traffic volume, speed limits, 
and the relative amounts of through and local traffic; along with reference to the 
built environment as shown by type and density of nearby development, number of 
lanes in the road, and the presence or absence of median dividers.  This classification 
function is somewhat like the establishment of zoning districts for the regulation of 
land use, but with one major difference: in access management, the regulations apply 
to the use of a public asset rather than private property. 
The second key principle is tailoring access management regulations to fit the 
roadway classifications.  If a given roadway is largely meant for low-speed local 
travel, interruption of traffic flow at driveways and intersections and traffic signals is 
expected and consistent with the road’s intended purpose.  Conversely, if the 
roadway’s main function is to carry large volumes of traffic over longer distances, 
such interruptions interfere with the purpose of the road and should be minimized.  
Safety concerns will also dictate wider driveway and street intersection spacing on 
high-speed, high-volume roads, particularly in urban settings where a driver’s 
attention is subject to more distracting influences.269 
                                                            
 266 Compare Magliochetti v. State, 647 A.2d 1386, 1393-95 (N.J. 1995) (deciding not to 
send the issue to an administrative law judge since the factual record about the access point’s 
location and functionality was undisputed and court involvement (in the eminent domain 
action) would be needed anyway), with Parkway 17, 735 A.2d at 601-02 (N.J. 1999) (differing 
on one key point: Magliochetti held that a jury could decide whether the alternative access 
was reasonable while Parkway 17 treated the matter as one that required specialized agency 
expertise). 
 267 See generally VA. CODE § 33.1-198.1 (2010). 
 268 See generally AECOM TRANSP., IND. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ACCESS MANAGEMENT GUIDE 
(Aug. 2006, revised Sept. 2009), available at http://in.gov/indot/files/guide_total.pdf; see also 
IND. CODE §9-21-19-2 (2012) (providing the legal authority for access permitting: “The 
Indiana department of transportation shall adopt rules and requirements for private entrances, 
driveways, and approaches necessary to provide for drainage of the highway, preservation of 
the highway, and the safety and convenience of traffic on the highway.”).   
 269 See TRANSP. RESEARCH INST. AT OR. ST. UNIV. & OR. DEP’T OF TRANSP., STOPPING 
SIGHT DISTANCE AND DECISION SIGHT DISTANCE (Feb. 1997), available at 
http://www.oregon.gov/ ODOT /HWY/ACCESSMGT/docs/StopDist.pdf?ga=t (explaining 
that traffic engineers have determined that, in addition to the time (and space) that it takes to 
stop a vehicle once the brakes are applied, it also takes time (and space) for the driver to 
discern an object or event in the road, understand its implications, decide how to react, and 
then initiate the action (such as applying the brakes)); see also id. at 24 (describing that the 
perception-reaction process takes longer on high-speed, high-volume roadways, such as 
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Third, how the regulations are applied through the permitting process depends 
not only on the classification of the roadway but also on the amount of traffic 
expected to use the driveway.  A high-volume driveway might require a right-turn 
lane or even a stop light, introducing another variable because its proposed location 
must meet traffic signal progression requirements.  On the other hand, a permit for a 
low-volume driveway might allow movements (such as left turns in and out) that 
would not be acceptable for a higher-volume use. 
Fourth, existing driveways that do not meet the new regulations normally are 
allowed to remain in service, but their use cannot be significantly expanded.  So, for 
example, the driveways serving a small 1960s-era sit-down restaurant might be 
“grandfathered,” but if the owner plans to tear it down and replace it with a fast-food 
restaurant—or to assemble the parcel with others to create a site for a big-box 
retailer—the prospective change in driveway traffic volume would trigger 
application of all the access management code’s permitting requirements.  Such 
provisions are analogous to “legal non-conforming use” status under a zoning code, 
blunting the impact of the access regulations on improvements that were lawful 
when built but not allowing the non-conformity to be expanded. 
Having considered how (and why) governments exercise their police powers to 
regulate access to roadways, we will next consider what rights property owners have 
to gain access to public roads.  As the next part of this Article will show, “access” 
encompasses a number of concepts, and not all of them are entitled to the same 
degree of legal protection.  And having a clear understanding of the kind of “access” 
at issue is critical when courts are called on to determine whether a property right 
has been taken. 
VI.  A SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT LAW OF ACCESS 
A.  Access to Traffic and Accessibility within the Network of Roads 
Changes to the network of public roadways can have a great impact on the use 
and value of private property.  When a new interchange is built on a major highway, 
for example, land situated at the interchange will gain development potential for a 
highway-oriented use such as a fast-food restaurant or gas station or motel.  Larger 
sites, further from the interchange but benefiting by its proximity, may become more 
attractive for industrial or commercial development.  The land now has access to 
something: to traffic volume, to a road that offers rapid long-distance mobility, that 
it did not have before.  Variations in these elements can have a significant influence 
on property use and property value.  Yet none of them have anything to do with 
access to land—with the ability to go back and forth between land and an abutting 
public road—which is the interest upon which the law of access is based.   
These multiple meanings can lead to confusion when access is at issue in a 
lawsuit.  When the Florida Department of Transportation closed the entrance and 
exit ramps at McCoy’s Creek Boulevard and Interstate 95 in Jacksonville, for 
example, the nearby area’s connectivity to the road network changed radically, as 
did its access to traffic on the Interstate.  An affected landowner, L.I. Gefen, sued in 
inverse condemnation, presenting expert testimony that the ramp closure 
                                                            
arterial streets and highways in urban areas, due to the complex conditions and driver 
expectations of an uninterrupted traffic flow); id. at 23, 25 (concluding that while the design 
standard for stopping sight distance on a road with a design speed of fifty miles per hour is 
461 feet, the decision sight distance for the same road in an urban area would be 975 feet). 
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substantially impacted access to and from her property and destroyed it as a business 
site.270  The trial and appeals courts agreed that a taking had occurred: in their view 
the evidence showed that “the closing of the ramp effectively denied suitable access” 
to the commercial property, which could “only be reached by an ‘indirect, winding 
route through several blocks of residential neighborhood.’”271   
But the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, pointing out that 
access from the Gefen property to the roads that actually abutted it was 
undiminished.272  What had changed was the way those roads connected to I-95.  Yet 
as the Florida court explained, the owner had no “compensable vested right to that 
access.”273  Nor did she have a right to high-volume vehicle traffic: “Access, as a 
property interest, does not include a right to traffic flow even though commercial 
property might very well suffer adverse economic effects as a result of reduced 
traffic.”274 
As the Florida court’s Gefen opinion illustrates, the law of access distinguishes 
between vehicle movements to and from an abutting road and movements within the 
road network.  And these differ yet again from access to traffic volume.  These 
differences—between access to land, accessibility within the overall system of roads, 
and access to traffic—have led to some generally accepted (but not often well-
explained) rules of law, as the following discussion will show.   
1.  Access to Traffic 
Traffic volume is the best-defined of all the “access” issues.  There is nearly 
universal agreement that no one has a property right in the volume of traffic using a 
road.275   
                                                            
 270 Dep’t of Transp. v. Gefen, 620 So. 2d 1087, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 271 Id. at 1088. 
 272 Dep’t of Transp. v. Gefen, 636 So. 2d 1345, 1346 (Fla. 1994). 
 273 Id.  
 274 Id.; see also Leonard v. People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1299 
(Ct. App. 1998) (“Such compensation must rest upon the property owner’s showing of a 
substantial impairment of his right of access to the general system of public streets.”). 
 275 See, e.g., Grove & Burke, Inc. v. City of Fort Dodge, 469 N.W.2d 703, 705 (Iowa 1991) 
(“We have long held that landowners have no vested right to the continuance of existing 
traffic past their establishments.”) (quoting Iowa State Highway Comm’n v. Smith, 82 
N.W.2d 775, 762 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gibson v. Comm’r of Highways, 
178 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Minn. 1970) (“A property owner has no vested interest in the continued 
flow of the main stream of through traffic.”); Barnes v. N.C. State Highway Comm’n., 126 
S.E.2d 732, 738 (N.C. 1962) (“An individual proprietor has no right to insist that the entire 
volume of traffic that would naturally flow over a highway of which he owns the fee pass 
undiverted and unobstructed. In fact, while under some circumstances and conditions he has a 
right of access to and from his own premises, he has no constitutional right to have anyone 
pass by his premises at all.”); State ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 126 N.E.2d 53, 56-57 (Ohio 
1955) (“It is now an established doctrine in most jurisdictions that such an owner has no right 
to the continuation or maintenance of the flow of traffic past his property. The diminution in 
the value of land occasioned by a public improvement that diverts the main flow of traffic 
from in front of one's premises is noncompensable.”); 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON 
EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.02(8)(d) (rev. 3d ed., 1997) (“The temporary or permanent diversion of 
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When the State of New York rerouted part of a highway leading to a popular 
recreational area in the Catskills, for example, it diverted traffic away from a 
restaurant and motel that previously enjoyed a “strategic” location.276  But the 
landowners had no right to any compensation for losing access to the tourist traffic 
that formerly passed in front of their business:   
A property owner so situated has no right to be located directly on a State 
highway nor does he have a right to have traffic pass in front of his 
property.  True, the presence of those factors may increase the value of 
the property, but any such increase is purely fortuitous in the sense that it 
does not result from any expenditure of effort or funds on the part of the 
property owner.277  
Instead, the advantage enjoyed by the motel was essentially an opportunistic one, 
like that of a diner next to an office building or a bar across the street from a 
stadium.  No one has a property right in the office workers on their lunch break or 
the fans after a football game; likewise, no one has a property right in the tourist 
traffic on a road: 
It is as if the State . . . shut down the recreational center which attracted so 
many persons to the area . . . .  Surely no one would argue that the State 
would be liable to the claimants for consequential damages resulting from 
such closing.  While the recreation center is in operation the claimants 
benefit because their property happens to be located in the same general 
area.  If the recreation center were closed, they would have no legal right 
to complain.278 
Given the clear consensus against compensating property owners when loss of 
traffic volume results in loss of property value, affected landowners commonly 
frame such claims as a generic “access” problem.  But any confusion can be sorted 
out by considering what would happen if the road did not change but the traffic 
disappeared: the extent to which a property’s utility and value decrease under that 
scenario is the extent to which those factors depend on traffic volume, not access.279 
                                                            
traffic as a result of highway construction does not effect a compensable taking so long as 
reasonable access is provided to an impacted property.”). 
 276 Bopp v. State, 227 N.E.2d 37, 38 (N.Y. 1967). 
 277 Id. at 39. 
 278 Id. at 39-40. 
 279 See La Briola v. State, 328 N.E.2d 781, 785 (N.Y. 1975); see also Kan. City v. 
Berkshire Lumber Co., 393 S.W.2d 470, 474 (Mo. 1965) (rejecting business’s claim for 
damages due to loss of “view” from the highway: “Any claim on this basis is inextricably 
related to a property right in the traffic upon Truman Road. Cases of this state have 
consistently refused to accord to property owners any right in the continuation of traffic upon 
an established highway.”).  It appears that two states, Alabama and Oklahoma, while not 
recognizing claims based solely on diversion of traffic, will allow evidence of lost traffic 
volume when assessing damages in partial-takings cases.  These decisions rest on the fact that 
traffic influences value; they err by allowing compensation to be awarded for the loss of 
traffic volume even though access to traffic is not a property right.  Compare State v. Moore, 
382 So.2d 543, 545 (Ala. 1980), and State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Bowles, 472 P.2d 896, 
899-901 (Okla. 1970), with Stipe v. United States, 337 F.2d 818, 821 (10th Cir. 1964) (“The 
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2.  One-Way Traffic Flow and Median Dividers 
Like traffic volume, the direction or pattern of traffic flow on an abutting road 
does not give rise to a property right.280  Courts in general accept the principle that 
regulation of vehicle movement on a public road does not affect any right of an 
abutting landowner.   
The use of median dividers to separate opposing streams of traffic illustrates this 
principle most starkly: if vehicles cannot turn left into and out of a property, visitors 
may find it less convenient to reach, and this could have an impact on both use and 
value.  Nonetheless, courts make no distinction between median barriers, “no left 
turn” signs and pavement markings, and one-way streets. 281   Each of these methods 
of controlling the directional flow of traffic is seen as a permissible exercise of the 
police power, not a compensable interference with a property right.282 
3.  Accessibility within the Road Network 
Drivers who must pass by a business due to a median barrier, turn around at a 
crossover point, and then come back to reach their intended destination experience 
what courts call “circuity of travel” or “circuity of access.” 283  Other alterations in 
the road network, such as street closure or rerouting, the creation of overpasses, and 
the use of service roads to replace direct highway access, can also result in a more 
roundabout way of travel.  Most courts hold that a road network change making a 
property harder to reach is “mere circuity of travel,” not a compensable interference 
with the access right.284   
                                                            
record as a whole discloses beyond any doubt that the decrease in the value of the business 
resulted not from the taking of part of Stipe's land, but from the relocation of Highway 69, 
which diverted traffic over the highway away from the business operation. Whatever his loss, 
it is due to the destruction or frustration of his business, and not the taking of the property. 
Such losses are not compensable.”). 
 280 See State v. Dunn, 888 N.E.2d 858, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“Indiana is in the firm 
majority of jurisdictions that have addressed whether the construction of medians in roadways 
constitutes a compensable taking and have concluded that it does not.”); Dale Props., L.L.C. v. 
State, 638 N.W.2d 763, 764 (Minn. 2002) (“[A] property owner who retains direct access to 
traffic in one direction, although losing it in the other direction due to the closure of a median 
crossover, retains reasonable access as a matter of law.”). 
 281 See State v. Kimco of Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 215 (Ind. 2009) (“Neither the 
construction of the median alone, nor the hypothetical conversion of Green River Road to a 
one-way street, would have constituted a compensable taking by the State.”). 
 282 See Hales v. City of Kansas City, 804 P.2d 347, 350 (Kan. 1991) (“We conclude that 
limiting the landowners' ingress and egress to lanes for southbound travel when they formerly 
had direct access to both the northbound and southbound lanes of traffic, whether by a median 
strip, one-way street, or no left turn, is a valid exercise of police power and is not 
compensable.”). 
 283 A roundabout course to get to a particular destination is “circuitous.”  The use of 
“circuity” to describe what happens when property is harder to get to within the network of 
roads is awkward, as the word is uncommon and easily confused with “circuitry.”  
Nonetheless, this unfortunate usage is too long-established to be changed.        
 284 See, e.g., State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. City of Springboro, 792 N.E.2d 721, 725 
(Ohio 2003) (“Mere circuity of travel, necessarily and newly created, to and from real 
property does not of itself result in legal impairment of the right of ingress and egress to and 
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This circuity rule is but another statement of a principle that has been part of the 
law of access since its early days.  Courts in the late nineteenth century did not make 
the public pay for every change to the streets that impaired access: instead, they 
required compensation only for those access-related damages that were special to the 
property involved.285  Only if a street obstruction made it difficult to get between a 
property and its abutting road were there (at least potentially) damages peculiar to 
that property, which the law regarded as a compensable event.286   
Conversely, a network-level change, such as the obstruction of a street some 
distance away, did not cause special damages.  Everyone who used the street, even 
people who did not own property on it, suffered the same inconvenience.  That fact 
made any resulting damage general.  Even though the owners of property along the 
blocked street may experience the inconvenience to a greater degree, the kind of 
damage sustained—namely, less convenient travel within part of the road network—
was not due to property ownership, but rather to membership in the affected 
community.  Accordingly, courts did not consider loss of accessibility within the 
network to be a legal taking (or damaging) of property.287 
Courts continue to find this distinction controlling. As the Colorado Supreme 
Court explained: 
The general rule is that an abutting landowner is entitled to compensation 
for limitation or loss of access only if the limitation or loss substantially 
interferes with his means of ingress and egress to and from his property.  
In determining whether there has been substantial interference . . . we 
have declared that inconvenience caused by the required use of a more 
circuitous route to gain access to property does not constitute substantial 
impairment of access.  The rationale for denying compensation for 
limitation or loss of access manifested by circuity of route is that the 
inconvenience suffered by the landowner is identical in kind to that 
suffered by the community at large, and the landowner's inconvenience is 
only greater in degree.288 
                                                            
from such property.”) (internal citation omitted); Dep’t of Transp. v. Taylor, 440 S.E.2d 652, 
654 (Ga. 1994) (explaining that a change to the road network causing inconvenience shared by 
the public in general, such as a change “resulting in longer drive to reach a particular 
destination,” is not a compensable taking of a property right); State v. Wood Oil Distrib., 751 
S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1988) (“It is well settled that damages to a condemnee's business 
which result merely from traffic being required to travel a more circuitous route to reach a 
condemnee's property are not compensable.”); 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT 
DOMAIN § 13.23(1) (rev. 3d ed., 1997) (“A change which results in inconvenience or a 
circuity of access is generally held to be non-compensable.”).   
 285 See, e.g., Rude v. City of St. Louis, 6 S.W. 257, 257-59 (Mo. 1887).   
 286 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Greeley, Salt Lake & Pac. Ry. Co., 22 P. 814, 815-17 (Colo. 1889). 
 287 Id. at 816-17; Rude, 6 S.W. at 258-59. 
 288 State Dep't of Highways v. Davis, 626 P.2d 661, 664-65 (Colo. 1981).  Judicial opinions 
often use “ingress and egress” to describe the movement between property and an abutting 
street.  See also Miller v. Preisser, No. 103,938, 2012 Kan. LEXIS 460, at *38 (Kan. Aug. 31, 
2012) (drawing a distinction “between direct access to abutting roadways, which creates a 
right of access that is compensable in an eminent domain action, and indirect access to a 
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One legal scholar has criticized the circuity-of-access rule as merely rhetorical.289  
But doing so misses the rule’s real insight: that it differentiates between network-
level inconveniences and those that relate to access between a property and the road 
it touches.  If a property owner has a right of access to and from an abutting road, but 
no right to demand that the linkages of the road network must stay the same, then the 
circuity rule still performs a valuable function. 
4.  The Minority Approach: When a Location within the Network                          
Becomes too Remote 
Courts frequently decide access claims by evaluating whether the property has 
“reasonable access” after the government action at issue.  Because “access” can have 
multiple meanings, however, a reasonableness analysis can blur the distinctions 
between access to land, access to traffic, and accessibility within the network of 
roads.  
Boehm v. Backes, for example, arose after the State of North Dakota closed the 
intersection between a highway and the local street on which a towing and auto 
repair business was located, creating a cul-de-sac.290  The business’s access to and 
from the local street was unaffected, but the street no longer connected to the 
highway; instead, the highway could only be reached “in the opposite direction via a 
circuitous route through a residential neighborhood.”291  The trial court, applying the 
usual circuity principle, dismissed the Boehms’ inverse condemnation suit.292  But 
the North Dakota Supreme Court did not limit the focus of its “reasonableness” 
analysis to the property’s access to the abutting street.  Rather, it looked at the length 
of the travel path to the main highway, concluding that there was a “substantial 
interference with direct access to the nearby thoroughfare” which “resulted in a 
compensable taking as a matter of law.”293 
Similarly, in Palm Beach County v. Tessler, the Florida Supreme Court 
considered the effects of a retaining wall, built within the public right-of-way, which 
blocked a beauty salon’s driveway to the main road, forcing customers to take a 
winding route through a residential neighborhood to reach the salon’s other 
driveway.294  Each party contended for a bright-line rule: 
Where there has been no taking of the land itself, when is a property 
owner entitled to be compensated for loss of access to the property caused 
by governmental intervention? The county argues that unless the property 
owner has been deprived of all access, the law of eminent domain does 
                                                            
nearby roadway, which relates to a regulation of traffic flow that is not compensable in an 
eminent domain action.”) (emphasis in original). 
 289 Stoebuck, supra note 107, at 744-45, 752. 
 290 Boehm v. Backes, 493 N.W.2d 671, 672 (N.D. 1992). 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. (“The trial court also ruled . . . that the damage they ‘have suffered to their access is 
a damage shared by the general public,’ and that their circuitous access was ‘not 
unreasonable.’”). 
 293 Id. at 674 (emphasis added).   
 294 Palm Beach Cnty. v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 847-49 (Fla. 1989). 
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not recognize that a taking has occurred. Respondents contend that a 
taking has occurred when any portion of the access has been eliminated 
and that the suitability of the remaining access may be taken into account 
in the assessment of compensation.295 
The court, however, rejected “both positions as being extreme.”296  Instead, 
striving for a balance, the court looked at whether the remaining access was suitable 
for the property as it was used by the business that occupied it: 
[T]he fact that a portion or even all of one's access to an abutting road is 
destroyed does not constitute a taking unless, when considered in light of 
the remaining access to the property, it can be said that the property 
owner's right of access was substantially diminished. The loss of the most 
convenient access is not compensable where other suitable access 
continues to exist.297 
The Tessler court emphasized that loss of access to traffic could not be 
considered in deciding whether access is suitable.298  But network-level access 
apparently could be:  the Tesslers showed a substantial loss of access to their beauty 
salon, sufficient to prove a taking, by evidence that “the retaining wall will require 
their customers to take a tedious and circuitous route to reach their business premises 
which is patently unsuitable and sharply reduces the quality of access to their 
property.”299   
The blurring of distinctions between the various types of “access” is perhaps best 
highlighted by the Kansas Supreme Court’s 1977 Teachers Insurance opinion.300  
That case involved Kellogg Street, designated as U. S. Highway 54 and State 
Highway 96, which was a major four-lane road through the City of Wichita.301  
Public authorities decided to make it into a highway with fully controlled 
                                                            
 295 Id. at 847. 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. at 849.  As the Tessler court noted, in Florida the ultimate question was a legal one: 
“[T]he judge . . . decides as a matter of law whether the landowner has incurred a substantial 
loss of access by reason of the governmental activity.”  Id. at 850.   
 298 Id. at 849 (“A taking has not occurred when governmental action causes the flow of 
traffic on an abutting road to be diminished.”). 
 299 Id. at 850.  The actual use of land and its potential “highest and best use” are often 
interwoven with access to traffic and convenience of access within the overall road network.  
See discussion infra Part V.C.  In Gefen, the expressway-ramp closure case discussed above, 
the owners of a commercial property presented evidence that loss of convenient access to 
Interstate 95 damaged the use and value of their property.  Dep’t of Transp. v. Gefen, 636 So. 
2d 1345, 1346 (Fla. 1994).  But the Gefen court distinguished Tessler as involving not just 
network-level access, but also loss of access from land to an abutting road.  Id. (“However, the 
facts of this case are significantly different from those in Tessler.  Gefen's access to all roads 
abutting her property is undiminished.”)  Accordingly, the reach of the Tessler decision is 
uncertain. 
 300 See generally Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n. of Am. v. City of Wichita, 559 P.2d 347 
(Kan. 1977). 
 301 Id. at 351. 
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(interchange-only) access and shift it to a new alignment slightly north of its old 
location.302  The old roadway, renamed Kellogg Drive, was narrowed to a two-lane 
street.303 
Three commercial properties on Kellogg Drive were most affected by this 
change.  Their driveways still connected to the old roadway pavement in the same 
places, but that pavement was now part of a five-block-long street, not a major 
thoroughfare.304  U.S. 54 and State Highway 96, still visible across Kellogg Drive, 
were now reachable only by a mile-long trek through several other streets.305 
The businesses sued Wichita, contending that the highway project constituted “a 
taking of their rights of access to a through street, Highway 54, Highway 96, and 
through traffic . . . [and] that the circuity of travel under the new plan is 
unreasonable.”306  The city, conversely, argued that no taking had occurred because 
access to the portion of old Kellogg that abutted the properties was unchanged and, 
in any event, the businesses had no right to the traffic flow that formerly passed in 
front of their properties.307 
The Kansas Supreme Court sided with the owners, for even though access 
between the business properties and the street was unaltered, the street itself had 
changed: it was no longer a highway, and it did not have a nearby connection to U.S. 
54.308  Seeking to distinguish its prior decisions in traffic-flow cases, the court 
declared that the highway had not truly been rerouted: it was just on the other side of 
Kellogg Drive, but out of reach.  That fact, in the court’s view, was tantamount to a 
denial of access.309   
Tellingly, the court then blended the concepts of access to land, accessibility 
within the road network, and access to traffic, concluding that: 
On the facts in the instant case we are dealing with two service stations 
and a candy shop.  These business properties are dependent upon access 
to the new highway facility fronting these properties.  In McCall Service 
Stations, Inc. v. City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 390, 524 P. 2d 1165, the 
court stated:  “. . . The value of a service station is dependent almost 
entirely upon the access the traveling public has to the service station.”310 
A subsequent decision by the Kansas Supreme Court distinguished the McCall 
opinion, on which Teachers Insurance relied, as involving closure of a business 
                                                            
 302 Id. 
 303 Id. at 350-52. 
 304 Id. at 351. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. at 352. 
 307 Id. at 353, 356. 
 308 Id. at 355-56. 
 309 Id. at 356 (“[W]hile the state is under no duty or obligation to send traffic past the 
plaintiffs' properties, as long as the traffic does pass the plaintiffs' properties they are entitled 
to avail themselves of it in common with other abutting property owners.”). 
 310 Id. at 356-57. 
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entrance, denying that there had been any compensation for loss of traffic flow.311  
And it characterized Teachers Insurance as a rather extreme situation in which the 
public authority had stipulated that travel to and from the property was not 
practical.312  Because the Kansas court has now squarely ruled that a network-level 
change to the street system leading to a retail center was not a loss of access,313 the 
continuing vitality of those earlier decisions is questionable.  Nonetheless, they serve 
to illustrate the confusion that can occur when a court is trying to determine whether 
a property has reasonable access without first carefully defining what “access” is. 
B.  Access to Land: The Point of Contact Between the Public and Private Pavement 
Thorny issues can also arise when a governmental action affects the ability to get 
back and forth between land and an abutting road.  That movement—the initial step 
into the overall road network—is “access” in its elemental form: the interest that 
courts have recognized since the nineteenth century.  As we have seen, too, it was 
the loss of this kind of access that courts have used to justify and distinguish 
decisions that seemingly allowed compensation for loss of traffic flow or changes to 
network-level access.314 
There appears to be universal agreement that government preclusion of vehicular 
access to any roadway is a taking that requires compensation.  But when a property 
has some vehicular access to a road, the analysis can be complicated. 
1.  Corner Parcels and Multiple Road Frontages 
As foreshadowed by the Brownlow and Wood gas station decisions in the 1920s, 
when a corner parcel is involved, public authorities may want to allow access to just 
one of the intersecting roads to minimize interference with traffic.315  If the legally-
recognized interest is access to an abutting road, as in Wood, the decision would be 
upheld as a permissible exercise of the police power—and one that does not rise to 
the level of a taking.316  On the other hand, if a property owner has a legal right to 
access each abutting road, as in Brownlow, then refusal of a driveway permit to 
either, even if demonstrably in the public interest, would nonetheless be a taking 
requiring just compensation.317 
                                                            
 311 City of Wichita v. McDonald’s Corp., 971 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Kan. 1999). 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. at 1198 (“Wal-Mart has misused the term ‘access’ in crafting its arguments. . . . The 
City did not permanently close any of the entrances or exits to the property. Wal-Mart still has 
four entrances located as they were before the project. In addition, Wal-Mart also has the same 
access to the same streets it previously had.”); id. at 1198-99 (distinguishing statutory factors 
that must be considered when awarding damages in an eminent domain case: “We will not 
rewrite the [statutory] language ‘access to the property remaining’ to mean ‘access to the 
highway remaining.’”). 
 314 Id. at 1199 (distinguishing McCall); Dep’t of Transp. v. Gefen, 636 So. 2d 1345, 1346 
(Fla. 1994) (distinguishing Tessler). 
 315 See generally Brownlow v. O’Donoghue Bros., Inc., 276 F. 636 (D.C. Cir. 1921); Wood 
v. City of Richmond, 138 S.E. 560 (Va. 1927). 
 316 Wood, 138 S.E. at 563. 
 317 Brownlow, 276 F. at 638. 
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Not surprisingly, judicial opinions still go both ways on this issue.  Some courts 
hold that an abutter has a right to access each abutting road.318  Other states allow 
public authorities to eliminate direct access to one street so long as there is another 
means of vehicular access to the property.319  So, for example, a decision denying a 
permit for a driveway from a fast-food restaurant to a high-volume state highway, 
and requiring access from an abutting township road instead, can be sustained if it is 
made pursuant to a reasonable and uniform policy.320  Similarly, an office complex’s 
access to one street may be closed, provided that reasonable access is available from 
another street.321  
2.  Parcels Fronting on a Single Road: What Access is Enough? 
For parcels that have frontage on a single public road, the broad consensus now, 
as in the 1910 decision in Goodfellow Tire, is that access may be regulated.322  In the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s words, “It seems to be . . . the general rule is that the 
property owner is not entitled to access to his land at every point between it and the 
highway, but only to free and convenient access to his property and the 
improvements on it.”323  This rule invites the use of a “reasonableness” analysis to 
                                                            
 318 See, e.g., Hilton Head Auto., L.L.C. v. S.C. Dep’t of Transp., 714 S.E.2d 308, 310  
(S.C. 2011) (“As an abutting property owner, HHA had ‘an easement for access’ to Highway 
278, ‘regardless of whether [it had] access to and from an additional public road.’”); Harper 
Invs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 554 S.E.2d 619, 622 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“Although Harper 
may have alternative access to its property on an abutting street . . . [this factor goes] to the 
amount of damages, if any, due Harper for the ‘deprivation of one means of access to [its] 
property.’”). 
 319 See, e.g., State v. Dawmar Partners, Ltd., 267 S.W.3d 875, 880 (Tex. 2008) (“In light of 
the considerable amount of remaining access to and from the property, we could not conclude 
that there is a material and substantial impairment of access . . . without imposing a 
requirement that there be some degree of direct access to the highway. . . . We decline to 
impose such a requirement because it would be inconsistent with our well-developed case law 
regarding circuity of travel.”); Commonwealth v. Comer, 824 S.W.2d 881, 883-84 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1991) (noting that property at intersection still had access to one street, therefore no 
taking occurred because the remaining access was reasonable); Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc. v. 
Dep’t of Transp. of Pa., 434 A.2d 1209, 1211 (Pa. 1981) (“[M]unicipalities may, under the 
police power, severely limit, or even eliminate, the right of direct access onto a public street—
at least where other available access exists.”). 
 320 Hardee’s, 434 A.2d at 1212. 
 321 City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Props., 218 S.W.3d 60, 61, 66 (Tex. 2007). 
 322 Goodfellow Tire Co. v. Comm’r of Parks & Boulevards of Detroit, 128 N.W. 410, 412 
(Mich. 1910). 
 323 State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Weiswasser, 693 A.2d 864, 873 (N.J. 1997) (citation 
omitted); see also Shaklee v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 491 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Colo. 1971) (“[A]n 
owner is not entitled, as against the public, to access to his land at every point on the property 
line adjacent to the highway.”); State ex rel. Dep’t of Highways v. Linnecke, 468 P.2d 8, 9-10 
(Nev. 1970) (“[A]n owner is not entitled to access to his land at all points in the boundary to it 
and the highway, although entire access to his property cannot be cut off. If he has free and 
convenient access to his property and his means of egress and ingress are not substantially 
interfered with, he has no cause for complaint.”); State v. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342, 351 (Ind. 
1960) (“The owners of abutting real estate are not entitled to ‘egress and ingress to their 
premises for the full length of the abutment of said real estate upon such highway.’ Nor is an 
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determine whether a governmental action that affects access, such as the closure of a 
driveway, is significant enough to rise to the level of a taking.  And reasonableness 
is the measure many courts use. 
The Texas Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co. provides 
a good illustration.324  The Bristol Hotel had three entrance driveways before the 
state began a highway project; afterward, the main driveway was so steep as to be 
unusable, but one of the other driveways could be converted into the primary 
entrance.325  These facts led the hotel’s appraiser to find over $500,000 in damages, 
primarily due to the loss of the former main driveway: in his view it would cause 
“some interruption in ‘traffic patterns’” and result in “new ‘site circulation 
characteristics’ of the hotel [that] would be atypical.”326  The Texas court agreed that 
access to the property not be as easy, but denied that there was a taking.  Rather, it 
found that the property “remained reasonably accessible because it retained two 
other driveways fronting the hotel and modified to provide adequate access for 
patrons, as well as two service driveways in the rear.”327  Because the hotel still had 
reasonable access, the court concluded that the appraiser’s damages testimony was 
improper. 
What if a public authority decides, for safety or operational reasons, to relocate a 
parcel’s driveway?  Does access have to be direct from the frontage of the property 
to the highway?  Or may public authorities enlarge the road network by creating a 
service road and use it to provide access to multiple parcels through a single 
connection to the highway?  The majority and dissenting opinions in the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s 2003 Preschool Development decision outline the contending 
positions.328 
State Route 73 is the main commercial corridor through Springboro, Ohio.  In 
1999, a company called Preschool Development, Ltd. (PDL) began to convert a 
parcel on that road from a residence to a daycare center.  The city engineer, however, 
determined that “although left turns in and out of PDL’s existing curb cut had been 
                                                            
abutting property owner entitled to damages merely for ‘a partial limitation and obstruction’ 
of the right of access. Such right must be substantially or materially interfered with or taken 
away.”) (internal citation omitted); State Highway Dep't v. Strickland, 102 S.E.2d 3, 5 (Ga. 
1958) (“[Abutting owners] are not entitled however, as against the public, to access to their 
land at all points in the boundary between it and the highway if the entire access has not been 
cut off, and if they are afforded a convenient access to their property and the improvements 
thereon, and their means of ingress and egress are not substantially interfered with by the 
public authorities in charge of the highway.”); Iowa State Highway Comm’n v. Smith, 82 
N.W.2d 755, 759 (Iowa 1957) (“It seems fairly well settled that, while access may not be 
entirely cut off, an owner is not entitled, as against the public, to access to his land at all points 
between it and the highway. If he has free and convenient access to his property and the 
improvements on it and his means of ingress and egress are not substantially interfered with 
by the public he has no cause for complaint.”). 
 324 State v. Bristol Hotel Asset Co., 293 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. 2009). 
 325 Id. at 171.  The third driveway required some regrading to restore its utility.  Id. 
 326 Id. at 174. 
 327 Id. 
 328 See generally State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. City of Springboro, 792 N.E.2d 721 
(Ohio 2003). 
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acceptable for the low traffic volumes associated with a single-family residence, 
these left turns would be hazardous for business-generated traffic volumes.”329  
Springboro subsequently obtained a permanent easement through an adjacent 
shopping plaza, then under construction, to provide a route for the daycare center 
traffic to go through the plaza’s parking lot to a single common access point on State 
Route 73.330  Finally, as part of a repaving project, the state closed off PDL’s 
individual curb cut. 
The company sued Springboro to compel it to bring an eminent domain action, 
contending that the city’s elimination of the curb cut “denied its right of access to the 
abutting public highway, S.R. 73, and constituted a compensable taking.”331  In Ohio 
the right of access to an abutting public road is considered to be “a fundamental 
attribute of ownership” and access to property “from the street or highway on which 
it abuts cannot be lawfully destroyed or unreasonably affected.”332  Accordingly, a 
“governmental action that substantially or unreasonably interferes” with a property 
owner’s “right to access public streets or highways on which the land abuts” will 
constitute “a taking of private property.”333 
A majority of the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the idea “that a substantial or 
unreasonable interference with access to abutting roads necessarily occurs when that 
access no longer is direct from the frontage of the parcel itself.”334  Instead, it applied 
the circuity-of-access rule: 
It is true that PDL no longer has access to and from S.R. 73 directly from 
its property.  It does, however, have access to and from S.R. 73 via a route 
that runs parallel to S.R. 73 from its property to the center line of the curb 
cut of an adjacent shopping center . . . .  The fact that drivers must 
negotiate one additional turn and travel 207 feet along a secondary access 
route rather than on S.R. 73 to reach the PDL parking lot does not warrant 
a finding of a compensable taking.335 
The dissenting justices, by contrast, believed that the right of access meant direct 
access to the abutting roadway.336  Like the Brownlow and Teachers Insurance 
opinions, the dissent in Preschool Development equated an element of property 
value with the existence of a property right: 
                                                            
 329 Id. at 723. 
 330 Id. 
 331 Id. at 724.  Under Ohio law, inverse condemnation claims are brought as mandamus 
actions.  If the affected property owner proves to the court that a taking has occurred, the court 
will issue a writ of mandamus directing the responsible government agency to file a lawsuit to 
appropriate the property that it took.  See generally State ex rel. Wasserman v. City of 
Fremont, 960 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 2012). 
 332 Preschool Development, 792 N.E.2d  at 724 (internal citations omitted). 
 333 Id. at 725 (internal citation omitted). 
 334 Id. (emphasis added). 
 335 Id. at 724-25. 
 336 Id. at 727 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
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The PDL property will most likely not house a daycare center in 
perpetuity.  When the owners sell the property, would its value be 
diminished without its own curb cut?  When faced with properties in a 
similar location, which would a buyer choose, the property with or 
without its own access to the roadway?  The age-old adage is that the 
three most important considerations in determining the value of a piece of 
property are location, location, and location.  From the standpoint of real 
estate values (excepting residential), direct access to a busy street or 
highway is among the most important aspects of location.337 
The dissent’s assertion about the value of direct access to a busy street is 
somewhat overstated.  Some land uses, such as retail, do seek locations that offer a 
high volume of local traffic, visibility, and convenient accessibility within the road 
network.  But direct access to the main road is not required, as the proliferation of 
mall out-lot development shows.  Other land uses, such as many office 
developments, chiefly need access to the local road network and may not benefit 
from traffic volume.  Still others, such as industrial uses, often look for access to a 
highway that provides rapid long-distance mobility; traffic volume is a detriment if it 
interferes with trucks heading to and from the site.  Yet the dissenting opinion does 
underscore the problem that courts face when legal rules, such as the bar against 
compensation for diminished traffic volume, conflict with what the real estate 
market does.  Since market-based evidence of use and value does not distinguish 
between amenities that happen to be available to properties in a given area and 
ownable rights that are specific to individual tracts of land, how should a court 
evaluate whether access is reasonable? 
C.  How can Reasonable Access be Measured? 
Access, as we have seen, has a physical dimension and another aspect that is 
essentially economic.  Any measurement of or decision about the reasonableness of 
access must consider how the access is used.  That factor depends, in turn, on the use 
of the property: a commercial building with a loading dock for semis has different 
access requirements than a beauty salon.  Yet even that can be hard to pin down, 
because how buildings and tracts of land are used changes over time.   
The Texas Supreme Court’s recent Dawmar Partners decision is an excellent 
example of how these issues can be analyzed and decided.338  Dawmar owned an 
eighty-acre farm tract at highway FM 1695 and Ritchie Road on the outskirts of 
Hewitt, Texas.  The property had direct access to the highway and its frontage roads 
until the state condemned thirteen acres to widen and elevate FM 1695.  At the 
condemnation trial, Dawmar gave expert evidence that, before the taking, the 
“highest and best use of the property was to hold it for subsequent commercial 
development.”339  The property remaining afterward still had access to two public 
                                                            
 337 Id.  Cf. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318-19 (1932) (rejecting takings-clause 
challenge against use of a public park to build a fire station; although the park may have 
enhanced the value of neighboring property “the existence of value alone does not generate 
interests protected by the Constitution against diminution by the government”). 
 338 State v. Dawmar Partners, Ltd., 267 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. 2008). 
 339 Id. at 877. 
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roads.340  Even so, Dawmar gave evidence that “loss of direct access to FM 1695 
made the remainder suitable only for residential development.”341  The jury evidently 
found this evidence to be persuasive, awarding over $400,000 in damages, and the 
court of appeals affirmed. 
On review, the Texas high court first asked whether diminished value resulting 
from a change in the property’s highest and best use was independently 
compensable: in other words, whether the government should have to pay whenever 
its actions decrease the economic value of property.  The court’s answer was 
negative: “diminished value is compensable only when it derives from a 
constitutionally cognizable injury.”342 
Under Texas law in access cases, that threshold is crossed “only when access is 
materially and substantially impaired.”343  So the next question was whether an 
impairment of access that changed a property’s highest and best use was necessarily 
material and substantial.  The court rejected this proposition as well, because it was 
too close to the diminished-value-as-taking concept: “it would be a rare case in 
which a reduction of access would not have some impact on the value of property, 
and the ‘material and substantial’ limitation would be effectively eliminated in the 
vast majority of cases.”344  On the facts before it the court could hardly have reached 
another conclusion, because the Dawmar property still had physical access to 3,992 
feet of road frontage.345   
This brought the Texas court to the final, critical question: whether the 
reasonableness of access must be evaluated in light of the property’s highest and best 
use.  That standard, the court decided, was too speculative.  Instead, its decisions 
analyzed reasonableness of access “in light of the actual or intended uses of [the] 
remainder property as reflected by existing uses and improvements and applicable 
zoning.”346  Hypothetical development plans might be pertinent to appraised value, 
but not to the threshold legal question: evidence that it would be more difficult to 
install driveways to unimproved land, or that hypothetical development plans would 
have to be modified, or that development would be less extensive and more 
expensive, was “immaterial” to the legal issue of whether a taking had occurred.347  
The Dawmar property was zoned for residential use and there was “no evidence of a 
pending request for a zoning change, existing commercial development plans, or a 
contract for commercial use.”348  Those facts, the court concluded, made “any future 
commercial development . . . purely speculative.”349 
                                                            
 340 Id.  
 341 Id. at 877. 
 342 Id. at 878. 
 343 Id. 
 344 Id. 
 345 Id. at 880. 
 346 Id. at 879. 
 347 Id. 
 348 Id. at 880. 
 349 Id.  The Dawmar court’s rejection of highest and best use as the reference point for 
determining reasonable access is significant for transportation planning.  Highway designers 
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Having rejected economic evidence as too conjectural, the Dawmar court then 
turned to the physical dimension.  The property still had “2,165 feet of access to Old 
Ritchie Road” and would gain “1,827 feet of access to New Ritchie Road,” which 
was to be built as a two-lane road with a center turn lane, curbs, and gutters.350  And 
there was no evidence of existing driveways, drainage systems, or any other physical 
features that would make access to these roads “impossible or impracticable.”351   
Because of this “considerable amount of remaining access to and from the 
property,” the court noted, it “could not conclude that there is a material and 
substantial impairment of access . . . without imposing a requirement that there be 
some degree of direct access to the highway.”352  Lack of access to an arterial road, 
however, did not equate to a legal impairment of access, and the Dawmar court 
declined to make it one, “because it would be inconsistent with our well-developed 
case law regarding circuity of travel.”353 
Dawmar involved vacant land, but access to improved properties can be 
evaluated in a similar way.  For example, when two commercial parcels in 
Lexington, Kentucky lost direct access to a main thoroughfare but retained access to 
a secondary road named Scott Street, the courts were called on to decide whether the 
owners had been deprived of reasonable access.354  The appeals court told the lower 
court to disregard the fact that vehicles on the main road would have to travel an 
extra nine-tenths of a mile to get to the businesses.355  But it should consider physical 
                                                            
can see existing uses and improvements and plan for access to them.  Existing zoning, 
approved site plans, and comparable acts of local land-use agencies are matters of public 
record and knowable by the highway authorities.  The concept of “highest and best use,” by 
contrast, is rather fluid.  Appraisers screen a property’s potential uses to determine which of 
them are legally permissible, physically possible, and financially feasible.  Of these, the one 
that is maximally productive (that results in the highest value) is the highest and best use.  
These tests are applied, in order, to “develop adequate support for [a] highest and best use 
opinion.” APPRAISAL INST., THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 278-79 (13th ed. 2008) (emphasis 
added).  Professional appraisers routinely have differing opinions about highest and best use.  
Notably, too, the property’s existing zoning is not determinative: an appraiser may conclude 
that market participants would pay more for a parcel than its current zoning would justify and 
hold it in anticipation of a zoning change.  Id. at 282; see, e.g., Masheter v. Kebe, 359 N.E.2d 
74, 77 (Ohio 1976) (“[A]s a practical matter, the existing zoning regulation does not and may 
not control the market value of the property involved. If, in the opinion of an expert appraisal 
witness, an informed, willing purchaser would be presently agreeable to pay more than an 
amount justified under existing zoning, such evidence is admissible [at trial in an eminent 
domain action] because it reflects upon the fair market value of the property.”).  Since highest 
and best use is a matter of opinion, not fact, it is not a reliable touchstone for highway 
planning and design.   
 350 Dawmar, 267 S.W.3d at 880. 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. (emphasis added). 
 353 Id. 
 354 Commonwealth v. Comer, 824 S.W.2d 881, 882 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991). 
 355 Id. at 883 (“It is well-settled law in Kentucky that reasonable restriction of access, 
rerouting of public highways, and circuity of travel caused thereby are not legally 
compensable.”). 
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access to the business properties: evidence “that Scott Street does not meet modern 
vehicular requirements, or that it was impassable at certain times, or that it provided 
insufficient driveway space for commercial vehicles, or that [Scott Street] in some 
way other than circuity was not reasonable access.”356 
Beginning the reasonableness-of-access inquiry with physical factors, and 
evaluating those factors in light of existing uses, improvements, and zoning, helps to 
clarify what is really at issue in an access case.   
At the most basic level of inquiry, is vehicular movement into and out from the 
property still possible after the access change?  Is there a driveway, or can one 
reasonably be built, to connect the property to a public road?  Does that road link up 
to the overall road network?  If so, then the property has access in the fundamental 
sense.357 
The next level of inquiry considers how an access change affects improvements 
on the property.  If there is pavement within the property (such as a parking lot) that 
is meant for vehicular use, is there a travel path between that pavement and a public 
road, or can one reasonably be built?  Can the kinds of vehicles that normally would 
be expected to use the property enter and exit the site and move about on the 
pavement within it, or would it be practicable to modify the on-site pavement to 
allow those movements?358  Looking out into the road network, are the physical 
characteristics of a public road to which a driveway connects, and those of a travel 
path to the general system of roads, adequate for the kinds of vehicles that normally 
would be expected to use the improved property?  If so, then the improvements have 
access in the expanded sense first recognized in the early Ohio decisions.359 
                                                            
 356 Id. at 882 (emphasis added). 
 357 Cf. Lexington & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. 289, 294 (1839) (stating that a 
private right in the street is legally attached to the contiguous lots or contiguous ground). 
 358 Courts differ on how to treat the relationship between on-site improvements and access.  
In one recent Minnesota appellate case, for example, the court decided that closure of an 
access point leading to a gravel pit was not a taking because gravel trucks could reach and 
enter the property at a different location.  The alternate entrance was close to the owners’ 
house and apparently not constructed for use by heavy trucks.  Even so, the court framed the 
issue as “whether there is a reasonably convenient and suitable point of access connecting the 
perimeter of landowners’ property to a public roadway,” reasoning that “[t]he convenience 
and suitability of ingress and egress pertains to the path between the abutting road and the 
parcel’s perimeter, not to a preferred point on the interior of the property.”  Oliver v. State, 
760 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added).  An Ohio appellate court, by 
contrast, found a taking to occur when some newly-installed curbing, which narrowed the 
driveways into a gas station, required the gasoline tankers that made deliveries to back into or 
out of the property.  State ex rel. Thieken v. Proctor, 904 N.E.2d 619, ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct, App. 
2008).  In that court’s view, the curb so “limited the tanker trucks' ability to access and leave 
the property” that it “substantially or unreasonably interfered with [the owner’s] right of 
access,” resulting in a taking under Ohio law.  Id. at ¶¶ 18-21.  Each of these examples deals 
with the convenience of movement within the property after an access change.  In Minnesota, 
the fact that gravel trucks could still reach and enter the property was dispositive: there was no 
taking even though travel within the property to the gravel pit had become more difficult.  In 
Ohio, by contrast, gasoline tankers could still reach and enter the property and make 
deliveries, but the court found a taking because the tankers’ exiting movement was 
cumbersome. 
 359 Cf. Crawford v. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459, 470 (1857) (holding that an 
abutter who erected buildings in reasonable reliance on the established grade of a street had a 
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At this point, any inquiry related strictly to access should end.  The land itself has 
access to an abutting public road.  And if the law extends to improvements on the 
land, as it does in a number of states, then they too have access to an abutting public 
road.360   
The few judicial decisions that took their analysis beyond this level got into a 
different subject:  the convenience of access to a given property as it is situated 
within the overall road network.  The towing business in Boehm and the beauty shop 
in Tessler still had access that was physically adequate to serve both land and 
improvements.361  What changed was the distance traveled to reach an arterial street 
or highway.  Most courts do not consider the convenience of access to an arterial 
thoroughfare, standing alone, to be a constitutionally-protected property interest. 
Finally, there is access to traffic volume.  A great weight of judicial authority 
rejects any assertion of an abutter’s right to traffic on the road.  Yet real estate 
experts know that a high volume of local traffic is good for most commercial 
development, while heavy through traffic benefits retail developments that serve 
regional areas.362  When property value is damaged by a loss of traffic, savvy 
claimants often will frame the issue as one of “access” or “loss of frontage.”  But if 
analysis shows that the same damage would result if physical access was unaltered 
but the traffic disappeared, then the true problem is not access, but lack of traffic. 
With these principles in mind, we will next consider how the law should resolve 
the disputes that will arise when an owner of abutting property wants to gain access 
to a public road in a way that clashes with access management regulations.  The 
following part of this Article will address how specific methods of access 
management fit within the framework of the law of access.  Then, more broadly, the 
Article will view access from the perspective of the road and explain why some 
asserted “access rights” merit scant legal protection because they amount to private 
claims, adverse to the public interest, in the commons of the roadway. 
                                                            
property right of access to the buildings that would constrain the public from materially 
changing the street grade without paying compensation).   
 360 See, e.g., State by Comm'r of Transp. v. Weiswasser, 693 A.2d 864, 873 (N.J. 1997) (a 
property owner is entitled “to free and convenient access to his property and the 
improvements on it”); Iowa State Highway. Comm’n v. Smith, 82 N.W.2d 755, 760-61 (Iowa 
1957) (holding that two access points were reasonable for filling station and cafe; adjacent 
residential parcel owned by the Smiths needed to have its own access point so the residential 
tenants would not have to share the filling station driveways).  A problem lurks here, though: 
some sites are laid out so that vehicles cannot exit from the same driveway that they entered.  
By designing the site this way, the developer externalized onto the public roadway a vehicle 
movement (turning around) and a traffic conflict point that, by current standards, should have 
been kept on-site.  Does this mean that the owner should have a right to two driveways while a 
neighbor, whose site can function with a single driveway, has a right to only one?  Why 
should the first owner’s decision about how to lay out his buildings and driveways enlarge the 
scope of his right, as against the public, in the roadway?  This externalization of vehicle 
conflicts (and development costs) is discussed in more depth infra Part VI.B. 
 361 See supra Part V.A.4. (discussing the Boehm, Tessler, and Teachers Insurance cases).  
The gas stations in Teachers Insurance may not have had physically adequate access: the 
opinion does not disclose whether the new travel path within the street system would 
accommodate tank trucks for gasoline deliveries.    
 362 THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE, supra note 349, at 222. 
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VII.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW OF ACCESS FOR ACCESS MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAMS 
In past years, the commons of the roadway was freely available for access to 
land.  On collector-type roads, with low speeds and low traffic volumes, frequent 
driveways were not a problem.  But arterial roads, which carried greater volumes of 
traffic going longer distances at higher speeds, were a different story.  Highway 
planners came to see that entering and exiting vehicles impeded the ability of an 
arterial road to handle through traffic.363  
Even so, the traffic volume and easy mobility offered by an arterial road made 
property along it attractive for commercial development.  Many areas along arterial 
roads were developed in an era when driveways “were simply built wherever 
someone wanted one.”364  Individually, each new development—and each new 
demand on the roadway for access to it—was economically rational for the abutting 
landowner, and the added burden to the roadway caused by one or two more 
driveways did not seem large.365  Yet every new conflict point consumed a bit more 
of the arterial road’s traffic-handling capacity.  Ultimately, the unbridled use of 
arterial roads for land access resulted in their degradation: a classic tragedy of the 
commons. 
Access management is a reassertion of public control over the commons of the 
roadway.  This message comes through clearly in the legislative findings of states 
adopting comprehensive access management legislation.  In New Jersey, for 
example, the legislature declared that the state highway system’s purpose was to 
serve as a network of principal arterial routes; that the state had a public trust 
responsibility to manage these highways to preserve their functional integrity; and 
                                                            
 363 See supra Part III. 
 364 DEMOSTHENES, supra note 188, at 4.  In some strip-type development, small residential 
lots fronting on a main road were at first converted directly to commercial use.  Later on, the 
demand for off-street parking led to redevelopment, with individual lots being consolidated 
into larger commercial parcels.  THE GAS STATION IN AMERICA, supra note 125, at 209-17 
(describing the growth of a commercial strip).  In the initial stage, each small parcel had its 
own driveway, as each needed access.  As parcels were consolidated, parking lots typically 
were built in front of the commercial structures.  This process, however, did not necessarily 
result in a significant change in the number of driveway connections to the road: decisions 
about how many driveways each parcel would have, and where they were located, were 
typically made for the benefit of the redeveloped site, not the roadway. 
 365 A property developer adding one driveway connection to an arterial road, like a herder 
adding one sheep to a common pasture, may not perceive that his action has any adverse 
impact on the public resource, but individually little actions with a big aggregate impact are 
the very hallmark of a tragedy of the commons.  The small scope of discrete acts is also no 
barrier to regulation that is necessary (and justifiable) because of their aggregate or cumulative 
effect.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (reaffirming that Commerce Clause 
regulatory power extends to activities, such as individual marijuana use, which Congress had a 
rational basis to conclude would “taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate 
commerce”); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 344 F.3d 832, 869-72 (9th Cir. 
2003) (upholding regulation of stormwater runoff from small construction sites; even if 
cumulative effect of small discharges was not quantified, EPA may write preventative 
regulations to protect water quality). 
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that land development activities and unrestricted access to state highways can impair 
their purpose and damage the public investment in them.366   
Similarly, the state of Washington predicated its decision to adopt an access 
management program on a finding that “uncontrolled access to the state highway 
system is a significant contributing factor to the congestion and functional 
deterioration of the system.”367  As part of the enabling act, its legislature declared 
that, “The access rights of an owner of property abutting the state highway system 
are subordinate to the public's right and interest in a safe and efficient highway 
system.”368  Other legislatures have made equivalent statements about the need to use 
access management to protect the functioning of their states’ arterial highways. 
In a sense, the term “access management” is somewhat of a misnomer.  From the 
perspective of the roadway, what is happening is traffic flow management: 
specifically, the management of where and how streams of traffic enter, exit, and 
move within the flow of traffic on the road.  One means of accomplishing this is by 
regulating the location and design of intersecting driveways and streets.  Another 
means is by governing the volume of traffic that can enter and exit the main flow—
for example, by allowing high-volume streams to enter at signalized intersections 
only.  Viewed from the perspective of the adjoining land, however, many of these 
methods to manage traffic flow on the roadway have the effect of regulating access 
to property. 
In any event, as public authorities implement access management programs they 
will confront property owners whose expectations were formed in a day when access 
to roads was largely unregulated.  For developing (or redeveloping) tracts of land 
there will be fewer obstacles to overcome, since new buildings and other site 
features can be planned with access management policies in mind.  In already-
developed areas, however, some sites—perhaps many sites—will have driveway 
connections to arterial roads that do not conform to the new access policies.  In that 
setting the public interest in preserving the commons, by managing arterial roads to 
preserve their traffic-carrying purpose, will collide with private investment decisions 
predicated on using that commons for a conflicting land-access purpose. 
As the next section will show, many access management techniques can be 
implemented without impacting any legally-recognized access right.  Others, 
however, may pose legal issues in some jurisdictions.  The following sections will 
suggest ways in which the private right of access may have been overstated and give 
reasons why the public’s right to manage its transportation system deserves greater 
weight. 
A.  The Application of Specific Access Management Techniques 
Perhaps the easiest access management technique to apply is the use of median 
dividers to eliminate a major source of traffic conflicts (and accidents) by preventing 
left turns.  The use of median dividers is squarely supported by well-established law.  
They do not infringe on any recognized property right.  The use of other methods, 
such as driveway design, to restrict vehicle movements to right turns in and out has 
not been considered by the courts.  Since right-turn-only driveways accomplish the 
                                                            
 366 N.J. STAT. § 27:7-90 (West 2010). 
 367 WASH. REV. CODE 47.50.010 (West 2010). 
 368 Id. 
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same purpose and have the same effect on abutting property as median dividers, 
however, the same legal principles should apply to them. 
The construction of dedicated turn lanes within the road right-of-way, to separate 
exiting vehicles from through traffic and provide merging space for ones that are 
entering, raises no constitutional or property-rights issues.  Whether an abutting 
property owner can be required to pay for that construction, however, or to transfer 
to the public the additional right-of-way needed for a turn lane, raises questions 
outside the scope of this Article.  Suffice it to say that if the government requires a 
property owner to transfer land or pay money as a condition of permit approval, 
there must be a rational connection between the permitted activity and how the land 
or money is used; there must also be a rough proportionality between the size of the 
land transfer or payment and the impact of the permitted activity on the public 
resources.369  Since access management codes typically require permit applications 
for large-volume driveways to include a professional traffic impact study, these 
concerns should be addressed as part of the permit process. 
From a design standpoint, the use of service roads to provide access to multiple 
parcels through a single connection to an arterial highway is an elegant solution to 
the access/mobility dilemma.  In those states that adhere to the “circuity” rule, the 
substitution of access to a publicly-maintained service road for direct access to the 
main thoroughfare should be viewed as a permissible change to the road network, 
not a compensable interference with property rights.  Even in states that have moved 
away from a bright-line rule against compensating for increased circuity of travel, 
courts have sustained the use of a service road if the travel path to the main 
highway—considered together with any other roadway access—is reasonably 
suitable to the property’s use.  
When a parcel with frontage on two roads is allowed to connect to the less 
traveled one only, the legal analysis in most jurisdictions should be like that for a 
service road.  Courts in a few states, however, do consider the access right to apply 
to each abutting road;370 in those jurisdictions a taking will likely be found unless 
right-in and right-out access to the busier road is also allowed.   
                                                            
 369 See, e.g., David L. Callies & Glenn H. Sonoda, Providing Infrastructure for Smart 
Growth: Land Development Conditions, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 351, 356-65 (2007) (describing 
“rational nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements for land development conditions).   
 370 There can be a definitional question about what the abutting road is.  During the heyday 
of the freeway-building era, “outer roadways” were sometimes built within an existing 
highway right of way and used to provide land access, while the inner lanes became a limited-
access highway that connected to the outer roadways at interchanges only.  In effect, the outer 
and inner roadways were a single public facility with “through” and “local” lanes.  Access to 
the local part (the outer roadway) was viewed as access to the abutting road, and the 
separation between the local and through lanes was analogous to a median divider.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Brockfeld, 388 S.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Mo. 1965) 
(preclusion of access to through lanes “without compensation to an abutter who is furnished 
unrestricted right of access to a lane of the highway upon which his property abuts and which 
connects to the restricted lanes at designated points” was not a taking; abutters had access to 
the “outer road” along the entire front of their property; “any compensation resulting from this 
situation would have to be for circuity of travel rather than for loss of access to the highway”).  
As the Brockfeld court perceptively noted, “[t]he real basis for complaint of an abutting 
owner, which makes a difference to him if he operates a commercial enterprise, is diversion of 
traffic,” but the abutter “has no right to a continuation of the flow of traffic directly in front of 
his property.”  Id. at 865. 
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A somewhat different question is presented when an access management code 
will allow direct highway access for a low-volume driveway, such as might serve a 
residential property or a small office, but requires side-road or other indirect access 
for a high-volume driveway.  In that case direct access to the highway is regulated—
based on the traffic volume of the proposed driveway—but not denied.  If the access 
management rule is being applied on a prospective basis, so long as some land uses 
qualify for direct access to each highway, even those jurisdictions that recognize a 
legal right of access to every abutting road should be less inclined to find a taking. 
Yet another access management tool is the use, by neighboring property owners, 
of a single shared driveway connection to an arterial road.  Like many other 
methods, the shared-driveway concept is most readily applied to a new development 
or redevelopment, where neighbors often enter into reciprocal easements for access, 
parking, the operation of common areas, and similar matters.371  Required sharing of 
a driveway as a condition of site plan approval for the enlargement of an existing use 
has been allowed, provided that reasonable limits on “neighboring” traffic volume 
were applied.372  It has also been upheld as a permit condition where each neighbor 
that would be sharing the proposed driveway had alternative, if less desirable, access 
to another road.373  When there is no alternative access, however, a court may well 
find the denial of any permitted connection to be a taking: if the neighbors do not 
agree to a shared driveway, then some other form of access, such as a right-in and 
right-out driveway, would have to be allowed to each of them.374 
It is not uncommon for access management tools, such as the installation of 
medians and the reconfiguration of driveway connections, to be implemented along 
with a general street or highway improvement project.  If the government uses its 
eminent domain power to acquire land for the project, there is a risk that the effects 
of police-power actions affecting access, which would not be compensable standing 
on their own, may become intermingled with the effects of the taking when just 
compensation is being determined.  Most judicial decisions that have squarely faced 
this problem require the two matters to be kept separate: a change in access to 
property that is not in itself a taking cannot be considered when determining 
compensation for another act that is a taking.375 
                                                            
 371 See, e.g., Gary A. Glick & Scott L. Grossfeld, Applying Reciprocal Easement 
Agreements to Retail Projects, 31 L.A. LAWYER 18, Nov. 2008, at 18 (discussing use of 
reciprocal easement agreements in retail development). 
 372 See Holmes v. Planning Bd., 433 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 1980). 
 373 See Paradyne Corp. v. State, 528 So. 2d 921, 926-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).   
 374 Where design considerations allow one, neighboring property owners might agree to a 
joint full-movement driveway in lieu of individual right-in and right-out connections. 
 375 See, e.g., State v. Marlton Plaza Assocs., L.P., 44 A.3d 626, 642-43 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2012) (claim for impaired internal traffic flow in shopping center improper in 
eminent domain case; it should have been raised in previous administrative driveway closure 
proceeding, and the driveway closure itself did not amount to a taking); State v. Kimco of 
Evansville, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 206, 215 (Ind. 2009) (partial taking did not “[open] the door” to 
damages claim for impaired shopping center traffic flow that resulted from the construction of 
a median divider); County of Anoka v. Blaine Bldg. Corp., 566 N.W.2d 331, 334-35 (Minn. 
1997) (Even if a prospective buyer would consider access to traffic, the court was “not 
persuaded that the policy of evidentiary inclusiveness in market value determinations should 
overcome the longstanding rule that loss of traffic access from the construction of a median is 
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Perhaps the most difficult problem is presented by densely-developed areas 
where parcels have access to an arterial road only and there is little room for physical 
changes within the road right-of-way.  In such places the only option may be to 
“grandfather” existing connections that were lawful when built, and to defer required 
compliance with the access management code until a driveway’s traffic volume 
increases (due, for example, to a change in or expansion of the property’s use).  New 
zoning rules have been applied in this fashion for many years and in that context the 
method has solid legal support.376 
This method, by tolerating the continued use of already-built improvements but 
preventing enlargement of the nonconformity, allows new access regulations to be 
phased in as land uses change and the useful life of existing buildings comes to an 
end.  At that point, any reliance interest would be small, as structures built with 
reference to the old access regulations have little current value.  Furthermore, even if 
the original permit is treated like an implicit agreement to let the owner to perpetuate 
the driveway, the new use—with its increased traffic volume and correspondingly 
greater impact on the roadway—alters the agreement’s terms in a way that should 
allow the public authorities to revisit it.377   
                                                            
not a compensable taking,” and letting the owners “introduce traffic access into the 
determination of market value would allow them to do indirectly what they cannot do directly: 
be compensated for the loss of traffic access from one side of the roadway when they retain 
access to the other side.”); 4A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 
14A.01(6)(a) (rev. 3d ed., 1997) (“[T]he state may . . . concurrent with a compensable taking 
in a condemnation proceeding, validly exercise the police power for traffic control and public 
safety for which there may be no compensation, even if it affects the method of ingress and 
egress to the affected property.”).  Courts that take the opposite tack give primacy to 
compensation without asking the logically prior question as to whether there is anything to be 
compensated for.  E.g., State v. Moore, 382 So.2d 543, 545 (Ala. 1980) (allowing evidence of 
loss in traffic flow to business resulting from a partial condemnation and construction of a 
median divider, “not as a separate item of damage, but as a circumstance ‘to enter into the 
question of the effect of the [taking] upon the entire tract’”). 
 376 See, e.g., In re P.M.S. Assets, Ltd. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 774 N.E.2d 204, 205 
(N.Y. 2002) (holding that the zoning board properly found that new owner’s lighting and 
design business impermissibly exceeded the scope of the previous nonconforming moving and 
storage use: “While nonconforming uses of property are tolerated, the overriding policy of 
zoning is aimed at their eventual elimination.”); Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the 
Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1235-38 (2009) (discussing 
amortization of prior nonconforming uses). 
 377 By their terms, driveway permits are often explicitly revocable, and courts normally do 
not view them as contracts.  See, e.g., City of Winston-Salem v. Robertson, 344 S.E.2d 838, 
839 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that driveway permit was a regulatory action undertaken 
for safety purposes, not an agreement for the owner to retain access at a particular point).  
Nonetheless, an owner affected by a permit revocation may argue estoppel as a reason to 
prevent a driveway closure.  See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Props., 218 
S.W.3d 60, 67 (Tex. 2007) (“TPLP argues that justice requires application of the doctrine of 
estoppel in this case because the City approved the driveway by approving the plat depicting it 
in 1975, and TPLP likely would have relied on the plat to confirm access to the property when 
it decided to purchase the property and spend over $1 million on improvements.”).  Like 
reliance, however, estoppel and other fairness-based arguments lose their force when the 
property owner wants to change the status quo by significantly altering the use of the property 
and the driveway. 
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B.  Direct Access to Arterial Roads as an Appropriation of the Commons                 
to Private Use 
Zoning law has been explained as a way of making sure that purely private land-
use decisions do not end up producing “a right thing in the wrong place,” like a 
factory in the midst of a residential neighborhood.378  Access management is 
somewhat like that: one of its aims is to concentrate the land access function onto 
collector-type roads and thereby prevent it from causing conflicts with traffic 
mobility on arterial-type roads.  Yet unlike zoning, which regulates the use of private 
property, access management regulates the use of public property by specifying 
where and how vehicular connections to the roads can be made.  Accordingly, courts 
normally have not applied the law of regulatory takings to roadway access issues.379  
                                                            
 378 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (The propriety of a zoning 
regulation, “like the question whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not 
by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered apart, but by 
considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality.  A nuisance may be 
merely a right thing in the wrong place,-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.  If the 
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative 
judgment must be allowed to control.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 379 Garrett v. City of Topeka seems to be the only case in which a state’s high court used 
regulatory-takings analysis to decide an access-related claim.  Garrett v. City of Topeka, 916 
P.2d 21 (Kan. 1996).  In Garrett an owner of property that was suitable for commercial 
development sued in inverse condemnation after the city enacted legislation prohibiting 
commercial driveways to certain arterial streets and then failed to complete an interior “ring 
road” that was meant to provide alternate access.  Id. at 26-29.  In its majority opinion, the 
Kansas Supreme Court decided that the facts stated a claim for an economic regulatory taking.  
Id. at 31-35.  It then employed a balancing test—the details of which it did not articulate—and 
concluded that a regulatory taking had occurred because the economic burden on the property 
owner outweighed the public benefit from the city’s actions.  Id. at 35-36.  The Garrett dissent 
argued that regulatory takings law did not apply because the city’s actions did not regulate 
how the owner could use her land; rather, the case involved restriction of access to an abutting 
street, an area of law that had its own well-developed body of cases.  Id. at 38-39 (McFarland, 
J., dissenting).  In subsequent decisions the Kansas court limited Garrett to its facts, 
emphasizing the importance of Topeka’s failure to complete the commercial “ring road” 
despite assessing the owner for the project.  See Eberth v. Carlson, 971 P.2d 1182, 1189 (Kan. 
1999) (“We limit the application of Garrett to its specific facts.”); City of Wichita v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 971 P.2d 1189, 1200 (Kan. 1999) (noting that the “‘economic impact’ 
analysis espoused by Garrett was new to condemnation cases in Kansas”).  A recent New 
Jersey appellate decision considered access law within the Penn Central regulatory-takings 
framework.  The appeals court reasoned that, because a property owner “does not have an 
absolute right to access the highway from any particular point on his or her property,” the 
owner’s “interests in any particular access point are not sufficiently bound up with their 
reasonable expectations of ownership to constitute ‘property’ for Fifth Amendment purposes.”  
From this, it followed that “modification or revocation of an access point, so long as free and 
reasonable access remains, does not constitute a [regulatory] taking.”  State v. Marlton Plaza 
Assocs., L.P., 44 A.3d 626, 636-37 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012) (citing Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).  The appeals court might also 
have concluded that, since there is no right to access at a particular point, the owner could 
have no “distinct investment-backed expectation” with regard to the particular driveway 
location.  Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124, 127 (discussing “distinct investment-
backed expectations” in the regulatory-takings analysis).  In any event, the Garrett dissent’s 
point remains valid: the Penn Central analysis should not apply because governmental control 
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Instead, an independent body of law has developed in this area, with courts typically 
seeking to determine whether the access allowed by the government is reasonable.380   
Disputes about access nearly always arise in a setting where a property owner is 
seeking relief due to some governmental action, so it is not surprising that most case 
law focuses on the private property abutting the road and the property owner’s 
rights.  But the question should be viewed from the other perspective, as well.  In the 
context of access management, what are the public’s rights?  Does a right of access 
to a way that is open to public travel necessarily encompass access to a multi-
million-dollar transportation facility?  To what extent can the public resist private 
claims to the roadway that conflict with the public interest?    
Suppose a vacant parcel of land at the corner of an arterial road and a collector 
road is being developed with a fast food restaurant.  The restaurant will handle a 
large amount of vehicle traffic, generating 240 trips per hour at the evening peak.381  
The site could be laid out so that vehicles reach it from the collector road, or it could 
be laid out with access from the arterial road.  Either layout provides a travel path 
that is physically adequate for the types of customer and delivery vehicles that 
normally go to a fast food restaurant.  In most jurisdictions, either site layout would 
have “access” as a matter of law.  So if an access management code mandated the 
use of the collector road access option, public authorities could require the site to be 
developed that way and not face a takings claim.   
Suppose, however, that the jurisdiction is one where a property owner has an 
access right to each abutting road.  There, even though collector road access would 
be entirely adequate for the parcel’s intended use, prohibiting a driveway to the 
arterial road would abridge a property right.  In that setting the access right 
encompasses more than just physically suitable access: it also entails a right to draw 
traffic directly from, and to discharge traffic directly onto, an abutting arterial road.   
Viewed from within the proposed restaurant site, that version of the access right 
means convenient customer access.  But viewed from the arterial road, it means 
traffic conflicts—four conflicts a minute during evening rush hour, detracting from 
the road’s finite capacity to handle through traffic.  In addition to physically suitable 
access, then, the abutter in that jurisdiction has a right to consume highway capacity 
by creating traffic conflicts on an arterial road.  If direct access to an arterial (or 
compensation for the loss of it) can be insisted upon, even when another adequate 
means of access is available, then the law has allowed abutting businesses to stake a 
claim to the roadway commons that is adverse to the general public. 
                                                            
of a public road (and access to it) differs fundamentally from regulation directed at private 
property, even though access decisions may incidentally affect how private property 
practically can be used.  Cf. Clifton v. Village of Blanchester, 964 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 24 (Ohio 
2012) (“[W]hen a government’s . . . regulation of property causes incidental damage to an 
adjacent but unregulated property, the damage is not attributable to the government actor for 
the purpose of supporting a takings claim.”). 
 380 What “access” is, and how “reasonable access” is evaluated, are two important matters 
in this determination that have received little systematic inquiry.  This Article is meant to 
contribute to a better understanding of those subjects. 
 381 The hypothetical trip rate is drawn from Table 1 of the San Diego Land Development 
Code’s Trip Generation Manual.  SAN DIEGO MUNICIPAL CODE, LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE: 
TRIP GENERATION 3-6 (rev. May 2003), available at 
http://www.sandiego.gov/planning/pdf/tripmanual.pdf. 
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Let us suppose, instead, that the law of the jurisdiction requires reasonable access 
only, and that the restaurant was built thirty years ago with driveways to both roads.  
Suppose, also, that the local government is planning a road project in which the 
driveway to the arterial road will be closed off and the driveway to the collector road 
widened to handle the additional traffic.  This new arrangement will be physically 
adequate for customer and delivery vehicles, and the site improvements (the 
building, the drive-through window, the parking lot) will still function for their 
intended purpose.  Most courts should view it as “reasonable” or “suitable” access.  
Some, however, might think the governmental act of closing the driveway to the 
arterial road must be a taking of some sort.  Yet why should the result be any 
different than the vacant-land hypothetical?   
The answer might be that the court is protecting a reliance interest: it believes 
that developed property oriented to arterial-road access should be left undisturbed.  
This still means, however, that the abutting owner is allowed a right to use the 
roadway commons in a manner that is adverse to the public.  Although the court may 
be rejecting new claims for direct driveway connections to the arterial when other 
access is available, it is honoring claims that were staked in the past—even though 
the traffic conflicts they create are avoidable.  If so, then a past arrogation to private 
use of the common resource of roadway capacity is given precedence over present 
efforts to conserve that resource. 
As the 1947 Public Roads Administration study showed, strip-type commercial 
development has had a significantly negative effect on the traffic-handling capacity 
of arterial roads since the early days of the automotive era.382  Yet back then, and still 
for decades afterward, real estate developers grabbed up roadway capacity that was 
freely available.  Instead of creating internal streets to provide access to individual 
lots, developers were allowed to use public roads for that function, splitting off lots 
along the frontage.  Small commercial parcels might have multiple driveways; each 
parking lot aisle or even every parking space might have its own connection to the 
public road.  Under the permissive circumstances of that era, developers did not have 
to bear the cost of providing a paved surface for access to the lots they split off, nor 
were they required to create lots that were large enough to keep on-site all the 
movements of vehicles using the site.  Rather, they were allowed to externalize those 
vehicle movements—and the conflicts with through traffic that they engendered—to 
the public roadway.383   
Going back to our hypothetical, we have assumed our fast-food restaurant has (or 
will have) ingress and egress via a collector road that is physically suitable for its 
vendors and patrons.  If the restaurant also a right of direct access to the arterial road, 
it might be framed as follows: in addition to having access that is physically 
adequate for the property’s use, the abutter has a right to create four vehicle conflicts 
                                                            
 382 See supra Part III. 
 383 The Montana Supreme Court recently dealt with this externalization problem in an 
inverse condemnation case that arose when a highway widening project caused an abutting 
owner, Faith Malipeli, to lose the ability to turn vehicles around in a previously-unused part of 
the public right-of-way.  Malipeli v. State, 2012 MT 181, ¶¶ 1-8, 366 Mont. 69, ¶¶ 1-8 (2012).  
The court decided as a matter of law that Malipeli had “no property interest in the use of the 
public right-of-way to turn her vehicles around,” id. at ¶ 25, because “it is up to the landowner 
to provide enough room on his or her property to maneuver vehicles” into position for a safe 
movement onto the highway.  Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25-27. 
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per minute on the arterial roadway.  Viewed in that way, a preeminent “right” of 
direct access appears to be an unwarranted intrusion into the arterial road, and 
perhaps an unsafe one as well if the vehicle conflicts result in accidents.384     
C.  Accessibility: Claiming a Property Interest in the Road Network 
As we have seen, for well over a century courts have drawn a distinction between 
access to land—the right to ingress and egress—and accessibility within the road 
network.  Early cases drew the line between special damages arising from the loss of 
access to land, which were compensable, and general damages resulting from a loss 
of accessibility within the road network, which were not.  Today most courts still 
reject network-level access-loss claims under the “circuity of travel” rubric. 
Some might contend that this distinction is an artificial way to impose a limit on 
liability when damages truly do exist.  Courts have long recognized, however, that 
the existence of damage does not necessarily mean there also has been an injury to a 
legally-protected interest.385  As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes acutely observed, 
“Government hardly could go on if, to some extent, values incident to property could 
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”386 
The importance of drawing a clear line against compensating for loss in property 
value due to network-level access changes becomes particularly compelling when 
public planning needs are considered.  Public choices about which roadway 
improvement projects to undertake, and about how they should be designed and 
                                                            
 384 One interesting Indiana decision held that an abutter could be liable for having too many 
direct connections to the highway.  The Holiday Rambler case involved a traffic accident on 
State Route 19 outside Utilimaster’s manufacturing plant.  Holiday Rambler Corp. v. 
Gessinger, 541 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).  Utilimaster had four driveways within its 
800 feet of frontage on the highway through which its employees would leave when their shift 
ended.  Id. at 561.  The accident occurred when one exiting employee stopped his truck part-
way into the road to avoid hitting vehicles exiting from the next driveway; a driver on SR 19, 
Martha Martin, hit the truck and then spun into the plaintiff’s motorcycle.  Id.  Utilimaster 
argued that it had no duty to control Martin’s conduct and therefore no liability.  Id.  But the 
court held that the company did have a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent a defective 
or dangerous condition on its property from causing injury to persons traveling on SR 19; 
whether allowing hundreds of employees to exit at the same time through four closely-spaced 
driveways breached that duty was a question of fact for the jury.  Id. at 562.  The plaintiff 
contended that the State of Indiana was also liable for failing to close some of Utilimaster’s 
access points to the highway and requiring it to use an internal service drive.  Id. at 564.  The 
court held, however, that driveway permitting was a discretionary function for which Indiana 
could not be liable under that state’s tort claims act.  Id.  The dissent in Holiday Rambler felt 
that Utilimaster’s conduct was simply that of operating a business, and the “exodus of 
employees” at the end of their shift was a normal incident to that business operation.  Id. at 
565 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).  But the majority believed the company had a duty to control 
the flow of employee vehicles leaving its property to avoid creating a hazard on the highway.  
Id. at 562.  This result suggests that the driveway location and spacing requirements of an 
access management code may come to define a duty of care, or at least be evidence of a 
standard of care, for abutting owners. 
 385 See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of Transp. v. Tomkins, 749 N.W.2d 716, 729-30 (Mich. 2008) 
(Historically, those detrimental effects of a public works project that were experienced by the 
public generally were not compensable; such incidental losses are considered to be “damnum 
absque injuria—loss without injury.”).   
 386 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
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built, are heavily influenced by cost.  But cost cannot be estimated if a decision 
about whether access rights have been taken depends on a later, fact-specific judicial 
finding about the “reasonableness” of the access to each parcel whose position 
within the roadway network is affected by the road project.   
In any event, such criticism of the circuity rule misses the essential point.  A 
claim of right to an advantageous location within the road network is weak at best, 
because the network is not individual property: it is community property, built and 
enlarged and maintained and used by the public.387  A change in how the parts of this 
road network connect together might enhance the value of some properties; but the 
public can make no claim to the increment of private property value added by the 
change.  So if a change in the connectivity of the network diminishes the value of 
other properties, the public should not be subject to a claim for the increment of 
value that is lost, either.388 
If we accept the fundamental idea that the road network is a public creation, then 
when a court allows an owner of property with a commercially advantageous 
location within the road network to insist that the public keep the network’s linkages 
the same (relative to her property) or pay damages, it allows that owner to stake out a 
personal claim of right in the public space.  Obviously the improvements on the 
property cost money to build, as they would have anywhere else.  But an 
advantageous location within the road network is not the fruit of any individual 
property owner’s labor or investment: it is the product of public investment and the 
overall community’s development.389  The existence of those locations, and their 
                                                            
 387 Cf. Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 319 (1932) (Courts are averse to equating 
property value with a property right, particularly “where the question is not of private rights 
alone, but the value was both created and diminished as an incident of the operations of the 
government” and “if the enjoyment of a benefit thus derived from the public acts of 
government were a source of legal rights to have it perpetuated, the powers of government 
would be exhausted by their exercise.”).  
 388 There is a potential connection between market value and the ad valorem property tax, 
which rises or falls in proportion to changes in assessed value.  But that tax is not directly on 
the value of the property: assessed value is essentially a measuring stick used to gauge what is 
being taxed, such as the privilege of membership in a particular community.  See, e.g., Fidelity 
& Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U.S. 54, 59 (1917) (noting “the distinction 
between a tax measured by certain property and a tax on that property”); Ohio Grocers Assoc. 
v. Levin, 916 N.E.2d 446, ¶¶ 17-21 (Ohio 2009) (distinguishing between “a tax upon a certain 
factor” and “a tax upon a privilege measured by that factor”) (emphasis in original).  If there is 
a connection between market value added (or subtracted) by a property’s change in position 
within the road network and its assessed value, the ad valorem property tax would increase or 
decrease as a result.  But payment of an annual property tax is different than sharing the sale 
price (the “value”) of a property.  If the public has no right to collect each dollar of a network-
related increase in value when a property is sold, it should have no duty to pay each dollar of 
network-related loss in value, either. 
 389 The role of the public in creating private property value was highlighted in a different 
context in the Penn Central case, where New York’s high court noted that “absent . . . heavy 
public governmental investment in . . . connecting transportation, it is indisputable that the 
terminal property would be worth but a fraction of its current economic value.”  Penn Cent. 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (N.Y. 1977).  Any analysis of 
whether government regulation excessively interfered with Penn Central’s ability to earn a 
reasonable return from its investment in the property, in the court’s view, must factor out the 
public investment that made Grand Central Terminal “a major transportation nexus [and] had 
 
68https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss3/5
2012] ACCESS MANAGEMENT  
 
653 
commercial exploitability, is every bit as fortuitous as the volume of traffic on the 
road.390    
The transportation grid and the pattern of land uses overlaid upon it evolved over 
time—and continue to evolve—as the product of the land development decisions of 
whole neighborhoods of property owners, of road-building decisions made by the 
public, periods of regional economic growth and decline, and even the cumulative 
choices of a multitude of individual travelers seeking a most-preferred route to their 
destinations.  The road network developed at the community level, and the benefits 
and detriments of any changes to it, although they are felt differently by different 
individuals, also occur at the community level.  Accordingly, relative accessibility 
within the road network should not be considered a subject of individual property 
rights.391   
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The law of access is a judicial effort to balance the interests of owners who 
developed their properties with reference to an existing roadway—and have reasons 
to want things to stay the same—against the public’s interest in making changes to 
improve the roadway or the overall road network.   
It emerged during an era in which the common law rejected the idea that an 
abutter had any legal right to complain about a use of the street for proper street 
purposes.    
In reaction, about half the states amended their constitutions to require 
compensation whenever private property was “taken or damaged” for public use.  
These amendments did not purport to enlarge the concept of “property.”  Rather, 
they widened the class of compensable events to include situations in which private 
                                                            
contributed substantially to the site’s value.”  John J. Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context 
for the Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARV. L. REV. 402, 410 (1977). 
 390 See Bopp v. State, 227 N.E.2d 37, 39 (N.Y. 1967) (traffic volume “may increase the 
value of the property, but any such increase is purely fortuitous in the sense that it does not 
result from any expenditure of effort or funds on the part of the property owner”); see also 
N.Y. State Thruway Auth. v. Ashley Motor Court, Inc., 176 N.E.2d 566, 569 (N.Y. 1961) 
(statute restricting billboards directed at drivers on the Thruway held to be constitutional; even 
if the legislation abrogated a property right, “[w]hat was taken by the regulation . . . was the 
value which the Thruway itself had added to the land and of this the defendant cannot be 
heard to complain”). 
 391 By way of analogy, government regulations that apply at the community level are not 
“takings” of private property rights because the resulting benefits and burdens are widespread.  
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it: 
Even where, the government prohibits a noninjurious use, the, Court has ruled that a 
taking does not take place if the prohibition applies over a broad cross section of land 
and thereby “[secures] an average reciprocity of advantage.” It is for this reason that 
zoning does not constitute a “taking.”  While zoning at times reduces individual 
property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude 
that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of the zoning will be 
benefited by another. 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (internal citation 
omitted). 
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property was damaged for public use even though none of it was physically occupied 
(“taken”) by the government.   
These changes to state constitutions opened the door to claims that property 
abutting a roadway was “damaged” if street improvements interfered with access to 
it.  Yet courts held that property abutting a public road was damaged, in the 
constitutional sense, only when movement between it and the roadway was 
obstructed.  Once the movement onto the roadway was completed, an abutting 
property owner had no greater right to easy or direct or convenient travel than any 
other member of the public.392   
What courts mean by “access,” however, is often not well defined.  Because 
certain attributes created by the community as a whole—such as the “arterialness” of 
arterial roads, traffic volume, and easy accessibility within the road network—add 
value to private real estate, they can become conflated with “access” and mistakenly 
seen as aspects of a private property right.  Commercial interests have exerted steady 
pressure to enlarge the scope of the access right to include these attributes.  If that 
happens, then the public’s assertion of greater control over the roadway commons to 
preserve the traffic-handling capacity of important thoroughfares may be viewed as a 
taking of access rights.  Consequently, the public would have to pay for the right to 
preserve the roadway network it created from traffic interference caused by 
opportunistic development that the network attracted. 
The goal of this Article is to create a clearer frame of reference for access-related 
decisions.   Different jurisdictions may well come to different conclusions about the 
scope of the access right and, consequently, about where to draw the line between 
regulation of access to the publicly-built road network and a taking of private 
property.393  No matter where they fall in the balance, however, those decisions 
should be a product of thoughtful and well-informed deliberation and cognizant of 
the public’s right to conserve its roadways. 
                                                            
 392 One notable critic of this concept focused on an unusual instance where an abutter had 
access to a public road that did not connect to the network.  Stoebuck, supra note 107, at 735.  
Such oddities are a weak basis on which to build a network-level access right, however.  One 
might more precisely say that a public road that does not serve a transportation function—by 
connecting to the overall road network or to a transportation node such as a ferry or an 
airport—is not a road at all, because it is not a public “way.” 
 393 Cf. Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1907) (“The right of an owner of 
land abutting on public highways has been a fruitful source of litigation in the courts of all the 
States . . . and each State has in the end fixed and limited, by legislation or judicial decision, 
the rights of abutting owners in accordance with its own view of the law and public policy.”). 
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